Workers' Compensation Claims in New Jersey

Background

“Workmen's compensation represents an attempt by the Legislature to place the burden of work-related injuries on the employer, who ultimately passes it on to the consumer.” (See Mayer v. John E. Runnells Hosp (1974) 65 N.J. 324, 325-26.)

“This is consistent with the philosophy that injuries are a cost of production and consumption. Our workmen's compensation scheme is humane social legislation aimed at placing the burden of compensation on those who benefit most from the manufacture of the product.” (See id; Hornyak v.Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. (1973) 63 N.J. 99 , 101.)

“The liberal intent of the Legislature has been held to include injuries which occur even after employment has been terminated.” (See Mayer v. John E. Runnells Hosp (1974) 65 N.J. 324, 325-26.)

“Our courts never interpreted the statute literally to apply solely to accidents on the employer's premises.” (See id.)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“The function of Workers' Compensation legislation is to require the consumer to ultimately bear the cost of injuries to workers through the cost of the service or product.” (See Kertesz v. Korsh (1996) 296 N.J. Super. 146, 152.)

“Regardless of the liberal policy with which the Workmen's Compensation Law, R.S. 34:15-1 et seq., should be administered judicially, the touchstone of liability must nevertheless be proof of a work-connected disability.” (See Bermudez v. Bell Container Corp. (1961) 67 N.J. Super. 280, 282.)

“The employee has the burden of establishing that his injury has resulted from a risk reasonably incident to his employment.” (See id; Tocci v. Tessler Weiss, Inc. (1959) 28 N.J. 582.)

"A risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service." (See Bermudez v. Bell Container Corp. (1961) 67 N.J. Super. 280, 282; Cierpial v. Ford Motor Co. (1954) 16 N.J. 561, 564.)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“We review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard that governs the trial judge's decision.” (See Kalim v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. A-4811-18, at *10 (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2021).)

“Under that standard, summary judgment will be granted when the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." (See id.)

"An issue of material fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.” (See id.)

“We owe no special deference to the motion judge's legal analysis.” (See id.)

The Court’s Decisions

It is well settled that “an accident arises out of the employment if it ensues from a risk reasonably incident to the employment. A risk is an incident of the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what the workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service. If the danger was one to which the employee was exposed because of the nature of his employment, the accident arose out of the employment.” (See Tocci v. Tessler Weiss, Inc. (1959) 28 N.J. 582, 597.)

It is also well settled that “the burden of proving that an accident is compensable rests upon a workers' compensation claimant.” (See Robinson v. United Airlines, No. A-5917-17T2, at *15 (App. Div. Sep. 18, 2019).)