Preview
Filing # 145662065 E-Filed 03/14/2022 03:18:10 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 19TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO. 21-610-CA
CHELSEA HILL, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Margaret Carlton, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEONEL LOPEZ, D.O.; PARAGON CONTRACTING SERVICE, LLC;
MICHAEL MALTMAN, M.D.; TREASURE COAST TOPDOC, PLLC;
MARTIN MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., d/b/a CLEVELAND
CLINIC TRADITION HOSPITAL; and MARTIN MEMORIAL PHYSICIAN
CORPORATION, INC., d/b/a MARTIN HEALTH PHYSICIAN GROUP,
Defendants.
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______________________________________________________/ Y
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PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIONARY MOTION IN LIMINE
Plaintiff, Chelsea Hill as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret Carlton, by
and through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(a)(6),
hereby move this Court for an order in limine, restricting opposing counsel and witnesses called
on behalf of opposing parties from mention of certain matters at any time during the trial of this
matter, including jury selection, voir dire, and opening statements, and in support of this motion,
shows the following:
1. The matters described below are not admissible in evidence for any purpose and have
no bearing on the issues or the rights of the parties in this case.
2. Permitting interrogation of witnesses, comments to jurors or prospective jurors, or
offers of evidence concerning any of these matters would prejudice the jury, and
sustaining objections to such questions, statements, or evidence will not prevent
prejudice but will reinforce the development of questionable evidence.
3. Plaintiff moves this Court for the entry on an order in limine prohibiting the introduction
of evidence that any expert, including Plaintiff’s experts, were previously named
Defendants in a medical negligence lawsuit, and that any settlement was reached as a
result of that claim or lawsuit. Such evidence is inadmissible. See Tormey v. Trout, 748
So.2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2nd 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998);
Manhardt v. Tamton, 832 So.2nd 129 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002).
4. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order of limine prohibiting reference to any advertising
by Plaintiff's counsel and any references to Plaintiff's counsel being greedy lawyers, or
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other similar comments. Whether Plaintiff's counsel exercised its First Amendment
rights to engage in commercial speech simply is not relevant in the case at bar. Further
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such unduly prejudicial and irrelevant comments amount to testimony by the attorney,
out of order, when he is not under oath, and would be clearly improper. Tampa Transit
Lines v. Corbin, 62 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1952); Kendall Skating Centers, Inc. v. Martin,
448 So.2d 1137, (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
5. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments based on Plaintiff's counsel having contact
with witnesses prior to their testimony. Pursuant to Florida Standard Jury
Instruction in Criminal Cases 2.05(7), "it is entirely proper for a lawyer to talk to a
witness about what testimony the witness would give if called to the courtroom. The
witness should not be discredited by talking to a lawyer about his testimony."
Comments and inferences to the contrary are impermissible, irrelevant, and unduly
prejudicial.
6. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments regarding the time period or circumstances
2
under which the Plaintiff hired an attorney. Watson v. Builders Square, 563 So.2d 721
(4th DCA 1990).
7. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments to the effect that any recovery by the Plaintiff
will not be subject to federal income tax or any other form of taxation. Good
Samaritan Hospital v. Saylor, 495 So.2d 782 (4th DCA 1986); Comfort Makers v.
Kenton, 515 So. 2d 1384 (5th DCA 1987).
8. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
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impermissible inferences and arguments regarding "crowded courtrooms" or identifying
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either directly or implicitly this case as being the type of case that causes delays or
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backlogs in the court systems. Stokes v, Wet'N Wild, Inc., 523 So. 2d 181 (5th DCA).
9. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments regarding any alleged effect or results of a
claim, suit or judgment upon insurance rates, premiums, or charges, either generally or
as particularly applied to the Defendant, as a result of this lawsuit or any other lawsuit.
Davidoff v. Segret, 551 So. 2d 1274 (4th DCA 1989).
10. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments as to an "insurance crisis." Davidoff v. Segret,
551 So.2d 1274 (4th DCA 1989).
11. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from
making impermissible inferences and arguments accusing Plaintiff's medical experts
of perjury or accusing Plaintiff's counsel of fraud or unethical conduct. Venning v.
Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Kaas v. Atlas Chemical Company, 623
3
So.2d 525 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1993); Stokes v. Wet 'N Wild, Inc., 523 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5 th
DCA 1988) and Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone, supra.
12. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting any expert from attempting
to bolster her/his opinion by referring to articles. The general rule is that authoritative
publications can only be used during the cross-examination of an expert and cannot be
used to bolster the credibility of an expert or to supplement an opinion. Erwin v. Todd,
699 So.2d 275 (5th DCA 1997); Liberatore v. Kaufman, 835 So.2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA
2003).
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13. Plaintiff moves in limine to prohibit counsel or any witness from mentioning that
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healthcare providers are the heroes due to COVID care or anything in such a manner to
boost the healthcare providers (including voir dire panel) by thanking them for their
COVID service or coverage.
14. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments challenging Plaintiff's counsel to explain to the
jury why they did not call certain witnesses, or why deposed witnesses were not at trial,
or making other references to matters outside the record. Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works,
545 So.2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); and Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone.
Supra.
15. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments stating personal opinions about the merits
of the case, the credibility of the witnesses, or the culpability of Margaret Carlton.
Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 474 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2 11d DCA 1985)
rev. den. 484 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1986); Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co., Inc., 553
4
So.2d 787 (Fla. 1s t SDCA 1993), rev. den. 624 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1993); Nelson v.
Reliance Insurance Co., 368 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1978); Riley v. Willis, 585
So.2d 1024 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); and Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone,
supra.
16. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making
impermissible inferences and arguments alluding to any matter that is not relevant to
the case or will not be supported by the evidence, asserting personal knowledge of the
facts, or stating personal opinions regarding the case or the credibility of the witnesses,
P Y
all of which is contrary to Rule 4-3-4e of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Silva
v. Nightingale, 619 So.2d xx (5th DCA 1993); Schreir v. Parker, 415 So.2d 794 (Fla.
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3rd DCA 1982); Pippin v. Latosynski, supra and Sacred Heart Hospital Pensacola.
17. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants' counsel from
making reference to, or publishing from, documents not in evidence and asserting facts
matters not in evidence or excluded because they were deemed inadmissible. Maercks
v. Birchansky, 549 So.2d 199, 199-200 (fla. 3d DCA 1989).
18. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting counsel from making
comments or arguments that are unsupported attacks on the character or credibility
of opposing counsel or personal opinions as to the justness of a cause or the
credibility of witnesses. Muhammed v. Toys "R" Us, 668 So.2d 254 (Fla. 1s t DCA
1996); Miami Coin-O-Wash v. McGough, 195 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Ryan
v. State, 457 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1984); Kendall Skating Centers v. Martin,
448 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 3r d DCA 1984); Hartford Acc. And Indemn. Co. v. Ocha, 472
So.2d 1338, (Fla. 4 th DCA 1985); Clay v. Thomas, 363 So.2d 588 (Fla. 4 t11 DCA
1985); Stokes v. Wet 'N Wild, Inc., 523 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1988); Pippin v.
5
Latosynski, 622 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1s t DCA 1993); and Sacred Heart Hospital of
Pensacola v. Stone, supra.
19. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding defendant counsel from
using the terms "us" or "we" or "our facility", or other such terms as would tend to
identify the defendants and the defendants' counsel as one and the same enterprise.
20. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding defense counsel or
Defendants from making comment, discussion, or reference in any way that the
Defendants' reputation will be affected by this lawsuit. Such references or statements
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concerning the portion above or any similar reference of any kind are irrelevant,
P
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immaterial, and inadmissible. Moreover, Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes states
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"relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Such statements, if permitted to be
made by counsel for Defendants, would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff under Section
90.403 of the Florida Statutes, as any statements would ultimately confuse, mislead,
and/or bias the jury.
21. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding defense counsel from
making any comment, discussion, or reference in any way that any Defendant will
have to pay the verdict. Such references or statements concerning the portion above
or any similar reference of any kind are irrelevant, immaterial, misleading, and
inadmissible. Moreover, Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes states "relevant
evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless
6
presentation of cumulative evidence." Such statements, if permitted to be made by
counsel for Defendant would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff, as any statements would
ultimately confuse, mislead and/or bias the jury.
22. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding the mention that any
Defendant physician is a "top doctor". Testimony that a physician is recognized as
a "top doctor" is error, See Liberatore v, Kaufinan, 2002 WL 1431317 (Fla. 4t h
DCA); TornIlan v. Grenitz, 782 So.2d 905 (Fla. 4t h DCA 2001). Accordingly,
counsel for Defendants, during their questioning of the prospective jury panel and
Y
during trial, must be prohibited from improperly and impermissibly injecting the
P
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subject that any Defendant physicians is recognized as a "top doctor".
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23. Plaintiff further requests that, if opposing counsel proposes a theory of admissibility
concerning the matters set out above, the Court order that opposing counsel first request
a ruling from the Court outside the presence and hearing of all prospective jurors and
jurors ultimately selected in this cause.
24. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any reference that any
expert from either side has had their opinion limited or excluded in another judicial
forum. Such evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible, and not probative in this case.
25. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any comment by one expert
on the opinion of another expert. Carlton v. Bielling, 146 So. 2d 915 (1' DCA 1962);
Carver v. Orange County, 444 So. 2d 452 (5th DCA 1983); Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So.
2d 747 (4th DCA 1977.
26. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any expert or witness
commenting on the credibility or reputation of any other expert witness. Ecker v.
7
National Roofing of Miami, 201 So.2d 586 (3"1 DCA 1967); Carver v. Orange County,
441 So.2d 152 (5th DCA 1983).
27. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any attempt to elicit any
new, different, or modified opinions from any of the Defendants' experts that were not
previously provided or testified to at the expert's prior deposition. Office Depot, Inc. v.
Miller, 584 So.2d 587 (4th DCA 1991).
28. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine that during the trial of this case, counsel
for the Defendants, and any defense witnesses should be prohibited from directly or
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indirectly attempting to raise or imply comparative negligence of Margaret Carlton.
What brings a patient to the hospital is irrelevant. See, Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So.2d
377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
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29. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from referring
to or seeking testimony as to Douglas Carlton being a registered sex offender. There
are no issues contained in this case that make any such reference relevant in any manner.
The only purpose to try and elicit such testimony is to inflame a jury which would be
prejudicial to the Plaintiff. To that end, the matter that lead to such finding is remote in
time. Moreover, it was a misdemeanor and not a felony.
30. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from referring
to Margaret Carlton being diagnosed with COPD at any time prior to November 1, 2020
as no such record contains such diagnosis outside of Dr. Maltman (a Defendant in this
action) placing this in his notes.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court order that counsel for Defendants, and through
counsel, any and all witnesses, be instructed to refrain from any mention or interrogation, directly
8
or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, including the offering of documentary evidence, regarding
any of the matters set forth in this motion.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
WE HEREBY CERTIFY a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Eportal who will serve
copies of same on: sent by electronic mail to Thomas Aubin, Esq., Stearns Weaver, et al., 200 E.
Las Olas Blvd., Suite 2100, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301, (mpodolnick@stearnsweaver.com;
taubin@stearnsweaver.com; aspencer@stearnsweaver.com), James White, Esq, White & Russell,
P.A., 11641 Kew Gardens Avenue, Suite 101, Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
(white@wrtrial.com; walsh@wrtrial.com; leone@wrtrial.com; parker@wrtrial.com;
wanser@wrtrial.com; pleadings@wrtrial.com) and Robert Paradela, Esq., Wicker Smith, et al., 515
E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (ftlcrtpleadings@wickersmith.com) this
14th day of March, 2022.
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RUBENSTEIN LAW, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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9130 S. Dadeland Blvd., PH
Miami, FL 33156
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Tel.: 305/661-6000
Fax: 786/230-2934
Email:bonnie@rubensteinlaw.com
efabricant@rubensteinlaw.com
eservice@rubensteinlaw.com
By: /s/ Bonnie Navin
Bonnie Navin, Esquire
Florida Bar No.: 487759
9
Preview
Filing # 145662065 E-Filed 03/14/2022 03:18:10 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 19TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO. 21-610-CA CHELSEA HILL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret Carlton, deceased, Plaintiff, v. LEONEL LOPEZ, D.O.; PARAGON CONTRACTING SERVICE, LLC; MICHAEL MALTMAN, M.D.; TREASURE COAST TOPDOC, PLLC; MARTIN MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., d/b/a CLEVELAND CLINIC TRADITION HOSPITAL; and MARTIN MEMORIAL PHYSICIAN CORPORATION, INC., d/b/a MARTIN HEALTH PHYSICIAN GROUP, Defendants. P ______________________________________________________/ Y C O PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIONARY MOTION IN LIMINE Plaintiff, Chelsea Hill as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret Carlton, by and through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(a)(6), hereby move this Court for an order in limine, restricting opposing counsel and witnesses called on behalf of opposing parties from mention of certain matters at any time during the trial of this matter, including jury selection, voir dire, and opening statements, and in support of this motion, shows the following: 1. The matters described below are not admissible in evidence for any purpose and have no bearing on the issues or the rights of the parties in this case. 2. Permitting interrogation of witnesses, comments to jurors or prospective jurors, or offers of evidence concerning any of these matters would prejudice the jury, and sustaining objections to such questions, statements, or evidence will not prevent prejudice but will reinforce the development of questionable evidence. 3. Plaintiff moves this Court for the entry on an order in limine prohibiting the introduction of evidence that any expert, including Plaintiff’s experts, were previously named Defendants in a medical negligence lawsuit, and that any settlement was reached as a result of that claim or lawsuit. Such evidence is inadmissible. See Tormey v. Trout, 748 So.2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2nd 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Manhardt v. Tamton, 832 So.2nd 129 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002). 4. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order of limine prohibiting reference to any advertising by Plaintiff's counsel and any references to Plaintiff's counsel being greedy lawyers, or P Y other similar comments. Whether Plaintiff's counsel exercised its First Amendment rights to engage in commercial speech simply is not relevant in the case at bar. Further C O such unduly prejudicial and irrelevant comments amount to testimony by the attorney, out of order, when he is not under oath, and would be clearly improper. Tampa Transit Lines v. Corbin, 62 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1952); Kendall Skating Centers, Inc. v. Martin, 448 So.2d 1137, (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). 5. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments based on Plaintiff's counsel having contact with witnesses prior to their testimony. Pursuant to Florida Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal Cases 2.05(7), "it is entirely proper for a lawyer to talk to a witness about what testimony the witness would give if called to the courtroom. The witness should not be discredited by talking to a lawyer about his testimony." Comments and inferences to the contrary are impermissible, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial. 6. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments regarding the time period or circumstances 2 under which the Plaintiff hired an attorney. Watson v. Builders Square, 563 So.2d 721 (4th DCA 1990). 7. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments to the effect that any recovery by the Plaintiff will not be subject to federal income tax or any other form of taxation. Good Samaritan Hospital v. Saylor, 495 So.2d 782 (4th DCA 1986); Comfort Makers v. Kenton, 515 So. 2d 1384 (5th DCA 1987). 8. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making P Y impermissible inferences and arguments regarding "crowded courtrooms" or identifying O either directly or implicitly this case as being the type of case that causes delays or C backlogs in the court systems. Stokes v, Wet'N Wild, Inc., 523 So. 2d 181 (5th DCA). 9. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments regarding any alleged effect or results of a claim, suit or judgment upon insurance rates, premiums, or charges, either generally or as particularly applied to the Defendant, as a result of this lawsuit or any other lawsuit. Davidoff v. Segret, 551 So. 2d 1274 (4th DCA 1989). 10. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments as to an "insurance crisis." Davidoff v. Segret, 551 So.2d 1274 (4th DCA 1989). 11. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments accusing Plaintiff's medical experts of perjury or accusing Plaintiff's counsel of fraud or unethical conduct. Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Kaas v. Atlas Chemical Company, 623 3 So.2d 525 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1993); Stokes v. Wet 'N Wild, Inc., 523 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1988) and Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone, supra. 12. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting any expert from attempting to bolster her/his opinion by referring to articles. The general rule is that authoritative publications can only be used during the cross-examination of an expert and cannot be used to bolster the credibility of an expert or to supplement an opinion. Erwin v. Todd, 699 So.2d 275 (5th DCA 1997); Liberatore v. Kaufman, 835 So.2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). P Y 13. Plaintiff moves in limine to prohibit counsel or any witness from mentioning that C O healthcare providers are the heroes due to COVID care or anything in such a manner to boost the healthcare providers (including voir dire panel) by thanking them for their COVID service or coverage. 14. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments challenging Plaintiff's counsel to explain to the jury why they did not call certain witnesses, or why deposed witnesses were not at trial, or making other references to matters outside the record. Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works, 545 So.2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); and Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone. Supra. 15. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments stating personal opinions about the merits of the case, the credibility of the witnesses, or the culpability of Margaret Carlton. Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 474 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2 11d DCA 1985) rev. den. 484 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1986); Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co., Inc., 553 4 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1s t SDCA 1993), rev. den. 624 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1993); Nelson v. Reliance Insurance Co., 368 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1978); Riley v. Willis, 585 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); and Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone, supra. 16. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from making impermissible inferences and arguments alluding to any matter that is not relevant to the case or will not be supported by the evidence, asserting personal knowledge of the facts, or stating personal opinions regarding the case or the credibility of the witnesses, P Y all of which is contrary to Rule 4-3-4e of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So.2d xx (5th DCA 1993); Schreir v. Parker, 415 So.2d 794 (Fla. C O 3rd DCA 1982); Pippin v. Latosynski, supra and Sacred Heart Hospital Pensacola. 17. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants' counsel from making reference to, or publishing from, documents not in evidence and asserting facts matters not in evidence or excluded because they were deemed inadmissible. Maercks v. Birchansky, 549 So.2d 199, 199-200 (fla. 3d DCA 1989). 18. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting counsel from making comments or arguments that are unsupported attacks on the character or credibility of opposing counsel or personal opinions as to the justness of a cause or the credibility of witnesses. Muhammed v. Toys "R" Us, 668 So.2d 254 (Fla. 1s t DCA 1996); Miami Coin-O-Wash v. McGough, 195 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Ryan v. State, 457 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1984); Kendall Skating Centers v. Martin, 448 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 3r d DCA 1984); Hartford Acc. And Indemn. Co. v. Ocha, 472 So.2d 1338, (Fla. 4 th DCA 1985); Clay v. Thomas, 363 So.2d 588 (Fla. 4 t11 DCA 1985); Stokes v. Wet 'N Wild, Inc., 523 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1988); Pippin v. 5 Latosynski, 622 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1s t DCA 1993); and Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone, supra. 19. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding defendant counsel from using the terms "us" or "we" or "our facility", or other such terms as would tend to identify the defendants and the defendants' counsel as one and the same enterprise. 20. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding defense counsel or Defendants from making comment, discussion, or reference in any way that the Defendants' reputation will be affected by this lawsuit. Such references or statements Y concerning the portion above or any similar reference of any kind are irrelevant, P O immaterial, and inadmissible. Moreover, Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes states C "relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Such statements, if permitted to be made by counsel for Defendants, would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff under Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes, as any statements would ultimately confuse, mislead, and/or bias the jury. 21. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding defense counsel from making any comment, discussion, or reference in any way that any Defendant will have to pay the verdict. Such references or statements concerning the portion above or any similar reference of any kind are irrelevant, immaterial, misleading, and inadmissible. Moreover, Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes states "relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless 6 presentation of cumulative evidence." Such statements, if permitted to be made by counsel for Defendant would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff, as any statements would ultimately confuse, mislead and/or bias the jury. 22. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding the mention that any Defendant physician is a "top doctor". Testimony that a physician is recognized as a "top doctor" is error, See Liberatore v, Kaufinan, 2002 WL 1431317 (Fla. 4t h DCA); TornIlan v. Grenitz, 782 So.2d 905 (Fla. 4t h DCA 2001). Accordingly, counsel for Defendants, during their questioning of the prospective jury panel and Y during trial, must be prohibited from improperly and impermissibly injecting the P O subject that any Defendant physicians is recognized as a "top doctor". C 23. Plaintiff further requests that, if opposing counsel proposes a theory of admissibility concerning the matters set out above, the Court order that opposing counsel first request a ruling from the Court outside the presence and hearing of all prospective jurors and jurors ultimately selected in this cause. 24. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any reference that any expert from either side has had their opinion limited or excluded in another judicial forum. Such evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible, and not probative in this case. 25. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any comment by one expert on the opinion of another expert. Carlton v. Bielling, 146 So. 2d 915 (1' DCA 1962); Carver v. Orange County, 444 So. 2d 452 (5th DCA 1983); Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So. 2d 747 (4th DCA 1977. 26. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any expert or witness commenting on the credibility or reputation of any other expert witness. Ecker v. 7 National Roofing of Miami, 201 So.2d 586 (3"1 DCA 1967); Carver v. Orange County, 441 So.2d 152 (5th DCA 1983). 27. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine precluding any attempt to elicit any new, different, or modified opinions from any of the Defendants' experts that were not previously provided or testified to at the expert's prior deposition. Office Depot, Inc. v. Miller, 584 So.2d 587 (4th DCA 1991). 28. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine that during the trial of this case, counsel for the Defendants, and any defense witnesses should be prohibited from directly or P Y indirectly attempting to raise or imply comparative negligence of Margaret Carlton. What brings a patient to the hospital is irrelevant. See, Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). C O 29. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from referring to or seeking testimony as to Douglas Carlton being a registered sex offender. There are no issues contained in this case that make any such reference relevant in any manner. The only purpose to try and elicit such testimony is to inflame a jury which would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff. To that end, the matter that lead to such finding is remote in time. Moreover, it was a misdemeanor and not a felony. 30. Plaintiff moves this Court for an order in limine prohibiting Defendants from referring to Margaret Carlton being diagnosed with COPD at any time prior to November 1, 2020 as no such record contains such diagnosis outside of Dr. Maltman (a Defendant in this action) placing this in his notes. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court order that counsel for Defendants, and through counsel, any and all witnesses, be instructed to refrain from any mention or interrogation, directly 8 or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, including the offering of documentary evidence, regarding any of the matters set forth in this motion. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WE HEREBY CERTIFY a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Eportal who will serve copies of same on: sent by electronic mail to Thomas Aubin, Esq., Stearns Weaver, et al., 200 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 2100, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301, (mpodolnick@stearnsweaver.com; taubin@stearnsweaver.com; aspencer@stearnsweaver.com), James White, Esq, White & Russell, P.A., 11641 Kew Gardens Avenue, Suite 101, Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 (white@wrtrial.com; walsh@wrtrial.com; leone@wrtrial.com; parker@wrtrial.com; wanser@wrtrial.com; pleadings@wrtrial.com) and Robert Paradela, Esq., Wicker Smith, et al., 515 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (ftlcrtpleadings@wickersmith.com) this 14th day of March, 2022. P Y RUBENSTEIN LAW, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiff O 9130 S. Dadeland Blvd., PH Miami, FL 33156 C Tel.: 305/661-6000 Fax: 786/230-2934 Email:bonnie@rubensteinlaw.com efabricant@rubensteinlaw.com eservice@rubensteinlaw.com By: /s/ Bonnie Navin Bonnie Navin, Esquire Florida Bar No.: 487759 9