Preview
(FILED: NASSAU COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2024 04:14 PM INDEX NO. 606292/2023
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 54 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/08/2024
Short Form Order
NEW YORK SUPREME COURT NASSAU COUNTY
Present: Honorable DICCAT.PINEDA-KIRWAN TA PART 13
meme pmnenterneannnennnenecnnn-ncen. x
JEFFREY BAIKOWITZ, actin; Index No.: 606292/23
curator to the property of HAR Y AIKOWITZ, Motion Date: 8/3/23
Seq.
Plaintiff(s), Teams: ir: 00 A.M.
-against-
YERAHMEAL JACOBSON and BLUEJAY
MANAGEMENT LLC,
Defendant(s).
waren renee mew en enn een --- were nnn ce cence ene enn anne nen encens:
The followin;
cross motion ‘bynumbered papers read on this motion
y defendants to dismiss.
by plaintiff for summary judgment in /iew of complaint and
PAPERS NUMBERED
Amended Notice of Motion-A ffidavits-Exhibits. EF 1 - 18,:20.- 21
Amended Notice
N of Cross-Mot -Affidavit-Exh EF 23.- 1, 1
Reply... Apeaseesesnees EF 32 - 50, 52 - 53
Upon the foregoing cited papers, and after Microsoft Teams conference, it is.
ordered that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in diew of complaint, and defendants
cross motion to dismiss, are consolidated for disposition, and are determined as follows
On.March 2, 2022, plaintiff Jeffrey Baikowitz, acting in his capacity as
curator of the property of his father, Harry Baikowitz (“Harry”), commenced a prior action
in the Superior Court of Quebec, Montreal District (“Prior-Action”), against the defendants,
Yerachmeal Jacobson (“Jacobson”) and Bluejay Management, LLC (“Bluejay”), acompany
Jacobson co-founded, seeking to recoup $750,000.00 invested by Harry in four of
defendants’ projects. In the Prior Action, plaintiff-alleged his father was mentally impaired
when he invested the money with defendants:
On September 30, 2022, plaintiff obtained a default judgment in the Prior
Action in the amount of $1,052,350.00 Canadian dollars (“Judgment”). Plaintiff now moves
for summary judgment in /iew of complaint pursuant to-.CPLR 3113 and 5303 to domesticate
and enforce the Judgment. Defendants cross-move to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 5304 for
lack of personal and subject matier jurisdiction
Pursuant to Article 53 of the CPLR, a foreign country money judgment which
is final and conclusive may be enforced in this State-by a motion for summary judgment in
lieu of complaint (see CPLR 5303.) Under the doctrine of comity, the New York:courts will
recognize the judgment provided it is based on procedures compatible with our concepts of
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due process, by tribunals which are fair and impartial, unless grounds for non-recognition
exist (see CPLR 5304[a][1] and [2]). Pursuant to CPLR 5304, grounds for non-recognition
include lack of personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction by the foreign court.
Plaintiff, as the party seeking recognition, beats the burden. of making a prima, facie
showing that the mandatory grounds for non-recognition do not exist (see CPLR 5304 [a]).
Conversely, a defendant seeking to resist recognition has the burden of establishing that a
ground for non-recognition exists (see CPLR 5304[c]).
Initially, as to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff has met its
burden of establishing that Superior Court of Quebec, Montreal District had subject matter
jurisdiction in the Prior Action. Pursuant to article 3148 of the Civil Code of Quebec
(“CCQ”), Quebec authorities have jurisdiction in cases where, among other things, “a fault
was committed in Quebec, injury was suffered in Quebec, an injurious act or omission
occurted in Quebec or one of the obligations arising ftom a contract was to be performed
in Quebec.”
In this matter, the evidence shows that Harry is a Canadian citizen, that he
lives in Quebec, and that at least some of the money he invested with defendants were sent
by Harry while he was in Canada from his Canadian bank.accounts. Thus, subject matter
jurisdiction cannot serve as a basis for non-recognition of the Judgment.
Turning to the issue of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to the Hague
Convention en the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, service in a signatory country may be made “by a method prescribed
by its internal law for the service of documents.in domestic actions upon persons who are
within its territory.” In the United States, the methods prescribed for service. on an
individual under the Hague Convention are set forth in rule 4 (e) (1) and (2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (see Daguerre, S.A.R.L. v Rabizadeh, 112 AD3d 876, 878-79
[2013]). Rule 4 (e) (1) authorizes service to be made. by “following state law for serving a
summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district
court is located or where service is made,” and rule 4 (e) (2). sets forth three specific
authorized methods of service on an individual as; (A) delivery to the individual personally;
(B) leaving a copy at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of
suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.”
In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted the affidavits of a process server
indicating that-service was effected on defendant Jacobson “by speaking to and leaving it
with ‘John Doe’ at the said place of employment located at.301 Mill Road, Suite L6”. The
affidavit of service further notes John Doe “stated he is authorized to accept for Yerachmeal
Jacobson.” The affidavit of servicé does not provide:any physical description of the “John
Doe” allegedly served, and does not state that an additional mailing was made.
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Service upon a person of suitable age and discretion at'a defendant’s actual
place of business is a state law method of service authorized by CPLR 308 (2), and thus
permissible under rule 4 (e) (1). However, CPLR 308 (2) additionally requires that the
summons be mailed to either the defendant’s last known address or actual place of business,
and personal jurisdiction is not acquired pursuant to. CPLR 308 (2) unless both the delivery
and mailing requirements have been complied with (see Daguerre, S:A.R.L. v Rabizadeh,
112 AD3d 876, 878 [2013]). Since the affidavit of service did not.state that the summons
was additionally mailed to Jacobson, it was insufficient’ to establish that. service: was
properly effected pursuant to CPLR 308 (2) (see Id).
Nor does the evidence show that Jacobson was served pursuant to.rule 4 (6)
(2), as plaintiff does not claim that he was personally served, or. that he was served
at his
dwelling or usual place of abode pursuant to 4(€)(2)(A) or (B). Thus, service:could only.
have been completed pursuant to rule 4 (e) (2) (C), which requires delivery to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. In support of their cross
motion, defendants submit, among other things, the affidavit of Jacobson, who states that
he was not served; that he has never appointed anyone to,receive service of process on his
behalf; and that there has never been a Court proceeding that conveyed the right of anyone
to receive service of process on his behalf. Thus,. defendants have met their burden of
establishing that a ground for non-recognition exists as to defendant Jacobson.
As to defendant Bluejay, rule 4 (H) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permit service by: (1) (A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an
individual; or (1) (B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process; or (2) at a place not. within any judicial district of the
United States, in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an individual,
except
personal delivery under (£)(2)(C)(D).
Personal jurisdiction over a limited liability company such. as Bluejay under
the CPLR is governed.by CPLR 31 1-a, which permits service upon: “(i) any member
of the
limited liability company in this state, if the management of the limited liability
company
is vested in its members, (ii) any manager of the limited liability company in
this state, if
the management of the limited liability company is vested in one or more
managers, (iii) to.
any other agent authorized by appointment to receive process, or (iv)
to any other person
designated by the limited liability companyto receive process, in the manner’
provided by
law for service of a summons as if such person was-a defendant.”
The affidavit of service upon Bluejay states that service was comple
ted “by
speaking to and leaving the same thereof with “John Doe’, . 4
person appearing in care and
in control and/or management and authorized to accept service of
legal process on behalf
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of Bluejay Management LLC.” The affidavit goes on to say that the process server was “able
to identify the person by means of verbal acknowledgment.” No deseription of the John Doe
allegedly served is provided in the affidavit of service.
In support of their cross motion, defendants submit, among other things, the
affidavits of non-parties Mare Jacobowitz and Joseph Gutwirth.
Mr. Jacobowitz states that there are only two members of Bluejay, himself
and his wife Hadassa Jacobowitz, and that no one other than the Secretary
of State of New
York has ever been authorized to accept service on behalf of Bluejay. He avers that he
never
received the summons in the Prior Action, and references the New York State
Department
Division of Corporations page for Bluejay, which shows that only the Secreta
ry of State of
New York is authorized to accept service on Bluejay’s behalf.
Mr. Gutwirth states that he is Bluejay’s comptroller, and that only he and Mr.
Jacobowitz were present at Bluejay’s office on the date of the alleged service. He avers
that
he was not served with process in the Prior Action. He attests that he had been in
contact
with plaintiff for several months prior to the alleged service but was never informed
the
Prior Action had been commenced until after the Judgment had been entered.
Thus, having failed to serve Mr. Jacobson, Mr. Jacobowitz, Mrs.
Jacobowitz
or the Secretary of State of the State of New York, plaintiff failed to acquire
personal
jurisdiction over Bluejay in the Prior Action.
Plaintiff contends that the Judgment should nevertheless still be domesticated
as technical compliance with the service requirements of the CPLR and Federal Rules
of
Civil Procedure can be excused. While plaintiffis correct in that CPLR 5305 allows
fora
foreign country judgment to be recognized even where there is a lack
of personal
jurisdiction, same only applies to certain limited circumstances, which are inapplic
able in
this matter. Thus, due to the lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants
in the Prior
Action, the Judgment cannot be recognized,
Accordingly, the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, and the action
is dismissed,
a
Any request for relief not expressly granted is denied.
eames
This constitutes the decision and order ofthe Court
ENTERED \
Dated: December 20, 2023 Jan 09 2024.
NASSAU COUNTY
DICCIA T. PINED SY IRWA
ene od.
COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE
HAMSHAREANSCDECISIONS-ORDERS, 20208) TaLaCmpint. XM. Dsmss,6
06292-23( 1), wpd dota
4.0f 4
Preview
(FILED: NASSAU COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2024 04:14 PM INDEX NO. 606292/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 54 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/08/2024 Short Form Order NEW YORK SUPREME COURT NASSAU COUNTY Present: Honorable DICCAT.PINEDA-KIRWAN TA PART 13 meme pmnenterneannnennnenecnnn-ncen. x JEFFREY BAIKOWITZ, actin; Index No.: 606292/23 curator to the property of HAR Y AIKOWITZ, Motion Date: 8/3/23 Seq. Plaintiff(s), Teams: ir: 00 A.M. -against- YERAHMEAL JACOBSON and BLUEJAY MANAGEMENT LLC, Defendant(s). waren renee mew en enn een --- were nnn ce cence ene enn anne nen encens: The followin; cross motion ‘bynumbered papers read on this motion y defendants to dismiss. by plaintiff for summary judgment in /iew of complaint and PAPERS NUMBERED Amended Notice of Motion-A ffidavits-Exhibits. EF 1 - 18,:20.- 21 Amended Notice N of Cross-Mot -Affidavit-Exh EF 23.- 1, 1 Reply... Apeaseesesnees EF 32 - 50, 52 - 53 Upon the foregoing cited papers, and after Microsoft Teams conference, it is. ordered that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in diew of complaint, and defendants cross motion to dismiss, are consolidated for disposition, and are determined as follows On.March 2, 2022, plaintiff Jeffrey Baikowitz, acting in his capacity as curator of the property of his father, Harry Baikowitz (“Harry”), commenced a prior action in the Superior Court of Quebec, Montreal District (“Prior-Action”), against the defendants, Yerachmeal Jacobson (“Jacobson”) and Bluejay Management, LLC (“Bluejay”), acompany Jacobson co-founded, seeking to recoup $750,000.00 invested by Harry in four of defendants’ projects. In the Prior Action, plaintiff-alleged his father was mentally impaired when he invested the money with defendants: On September 30, 2022, plaintiff obtained a default judgment in the Prior Action in the amount of $1,052,350.00 Canadian dollars (“Judgment”). Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment in /iew of complaint pursuant to-.CPLR 3113 and 5303 to domesticate and enforce the Judgment. Defendants cross-move to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 5304 for lack of personal and subject matier jurisdiction Pursuant to Article 53 of the CPLR, a foreign country money judgment which is final and conclusive may be enforced in this State-by a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint (see CPLR 5303.) Under the doctrine of comity, the New York:courts will recognize the judgment provided it is based on procedures compatible with our concepts of HAMSHARE\NSC\DECISIONS-ORDERS 2023\S5 InLuCmpInt:XM .Dsmss.606292-23(1}.wpd lof 4 4+ Cf£ 44 INDEX NO. 606292/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 54 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/08/2024 due process, by tribunals which are fair and impartial, unless grounds for non-recognition exist (see CPLR 5304[a][1] and [2]). Pursuant to CPLR 5304, grounds for non-recognition include lack of personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction by the foreign court. Plaintiff, as the party seeking recognition, beats the burden. of making a prima, facie showing that the mandatory grounds for non-recognition do not exist (see CPLR 5304 [a]). Conversely, a defendant seeking to resist recognition has the burden of establishing that a ground for non-recognition exists (see CPLR 5304[c]). Initially, as to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff has met its burden of establishing that Superior Court of Quebec, Montreal District had subject matter jurisdiction in the Prior Action. Pursuant to article 3148 of the Civil Code of Quebec (“CCQ”), Quebec authorities have jurisdiction in cases where, among other things, “a fault was committed in Quebec, injury was suffered in Quebec, an injurious act or omission occurted in Quebec or one of the obligations arising ftom a contract was to be performed in Quebec.” In this matter, the evidence shows that Harry is a Canadian citizen, that he lives in Quebec, and that at least some of the money he invested with defendants were sent by Harry while he was in Canada from his Canadian bank.accounts. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction cannot serve as a basis for non-recognition of the Judgment. Turning to the issue of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to the Hague Convention en the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, service in a signatory country may be made “by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents.in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory.” In the United States, the methods prescribed for service. on an individual under the Hague Convention are set forth in rule 4 (e) (1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Daguerre, S.A.R.L. v Rabizadeh, 112 AD3d 876, 878-79 [2013]). Rule 4 (e) (1) authorizes service to be made. by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made,” and rule 4 (e) (2). sets forth three specific authorized methods of service on an individual as; (A) delivery to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted the affidavits of a process server indicating that-service was effected on defendant Jacobson “by speaking to and leaving it with ‘John Doe’ at the said place of employment located at.301 Mill Road, Suite L6”. The affidavit of service further notes John Doe “stated he is authorized to accept for Yerachmeal Jacobson.” The affidavit of servicé does not provide:any physical description of the “John Doe” allegedly served, and does not state that an additional mailing was made. HAMSHAREWSC\DECISIONS-ORDERS. 2023\SJ.InLuCmplnt.XM.Dsinss,606292-23(1).wpd 2of 4 2 ef 4 (FILED: NASSAU COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2024 04:14 PM INDEX NO. 606292/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 54 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/08/2024 Service upon a person of suitable age and discretion at'a defendant’s actual place of business is a state law method of service authorized by CPLR 308 (2), and thus permissible under rule 4 (e) (1). However, CPLR 308 (2) additionally requires that the summons be mailed to either the defendant’s last known address or actual place of business, and personal jurisdiction is not acquired pursuant to. CPLR 308 (2) unless both the delivery and mailing requirements have been complied with (see Daguerre, S:A.R.L. v Rabizadeh, 112 AD3d 876, 878 [2013]). Since the affidavit of service did not.state that the summons was additionally mailed to Jacobson, it was insufficient’ to establish that. service: was properly effected pursuant to CPLR 308 (2) (see Id). Nor does the evidence show that Jacobson was served pursuant to.rule 4 (6) (2), as plaintiff does not claim that he was personally served, or. that he was served at his dwelling or usual place of abode pursuant to 4(€)(2)(A) or (B). Thus, service:could only. have been completed pursuant to rule 4 (e) (2) (C), which requires delivery to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. In support of their cross motion, defendants submit, among other things, the affidavit of Jacobson, who states that he was not served; that he has never appointed anyone to,receive service of process on his behalf; and that there has never been a Court proceeding that conveyed the right of anyone to receive service of process on his behalf. Thus,. defendants have met their burden of establishing that a ground for non-recognition exists as to defendant Jacobson. As to defendant Bluejay, rule 4 (H) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit service by: (1) (A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual; or (1) (B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process; or (2) at a place not. within any judicial district of the United States, in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an individual, except personal delivery under (£)(2)(C)(D). Personal jurisdiction over a limited liability company such. as Bluejay under the CPLR is governed.by CPLR 31 1-a, which permits service upon: “(i) any member of the limited liability company in this state, if the management of the limited liability company is vested in its members, (ii) any manager of the limited liability company in this state, if the management of the limited liability company is vested in one or more managers, (iii) to. any other agent authorized by appointment to receive process, or (iv) to any other person designated by the limited liability companyto receive process, in the manner’ provided by law for service of a summons as if such person was-a defendant.” The affidavit of service upon Bluejay states that service was comple ted “by speaking to and leaving the same thereof with “John Doe’, . 4 person appearing in care and in control and/or management and authorized to accept service of legal process on behalf HAMSHARE'NSC\DECISIONS-ORDERS. 2023'SJ.InLuCmplnt:XM .Dsmss:60 6292-23( 1).wpd 3of 4 3 £4 INDEX NO. 606292/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 54 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/08/2024 of Bluejay Management LLC.” The affidavit goes on to say that the process server was “able to identify the person by means of verbal acknowledgment.” No deseription of the John Doe allegedly served is provided in the affidavit of service. In support of their cross motion, defendants submit, among other things, the affidavits of non-parties Mare Jacobowitz and Joseph Gutwirth. Mr. Jacobowitz states that there are only two members of Bluejay, himself and his wife Hadassa Jacobowitz, and that no one other than the Secretary of State of New York has ever been authorized to accept service on behalf of Bluejay. He avers that he never received the summons in the Prior Action, and references the New York State Department Division of Corporations page for Bluejay, which shows that only the Secreta ry of State of New York is authorized to accept service on Bluejay’s behalf. Mr. Gutwirth states that he is Bluejay’s comptroller, and that only he and Mr. Jacobowitz were present at Bluejay’s office on the date of the alleged service. He avers that he was not served with process in the Prior Action. He attests that he had been in contact with plaintiff for several months prior to the alleged service but was never informed the Prior Action had been commenced until after the Judgment had been entered. Thus, having failed to serve Mr. Jacobson, Mr. Jacobowitz, Mrs. Jacobowitz or the Secretary of State of the State of New York, plaintiff failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over Bluejay in the Prior Action. Plaintiff contends that the Judgment should nevertheless still be domesticated as technical compliance with the service requirements of the CPLR and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be excused. While plaintiffis correct in that CPLR 5305 allows fora foreign country judgment to be recognized even where there is a lack of personal jurisdiction, same only applies to certain limited circumstances, which are inapplic able in this matter. Thus, due to the lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in the Prior Action, the Judgment cannot be recognized, Accordingly, the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, and the action is dismissed, a Any request for relief not expressly granted is denied. eames This constitutes the decision and order ofthe Court ENTERED \ Dated: December 20, 2023 Jan 09 2024. NASSAU COUNTY DICCIA T. PINED SY IRWA ene od. COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE HAMSHAREANSCDECISIONS-ORDERS, 20208) TaLaCmpint. XM. Dsmss,6 06292-23( 1), wpd dota 4.0f 4