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Filing # 178609180 E-Filed 07/31/2023 05:22:32 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
MARISOL ESCOBAR, as Mother and
Natural Guardian of her Minor Child,
DIEGO REY, In and For DIEGO REY,
CASE NO. 2022-02095 1-CA-25
Plaintiff,
CIVIL DIVISION
Vv,
ARILAR GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
/
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AND STAY
COME NOW, Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC (“ARILAR”), by and through
undersigned counsel hereby files this Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Motion to Stay, as its response to the Complaint of Plaintiff, MARISOL
ESCOBAR, as mother and natural guardian of her minor child, DIEGO REY (“Plaintiff”), and in
support thereof states:
Facts and Allegation:
On November 01, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Defendant. See
Plaintiff's Complaint attached hereto as ExhibitA.
The Plaintiff's Complaint was served on the Defendant on November 15, 2022.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges an injury occurred on Defendant’s property at Urban Air
Trampoline and Adventure Park, 15625 SW sg" Street, Miami, Florida 33196 (the
“Property”) on or about December 18, 2021. See Exhibit A at ¥ 6.
Plaintiff alleges that he was in a play area of the Property when he allegedly injured his
CASE NO. 2022-02095 1-CA-25
Page 2
face on a metal object as a result of the “negligent and careless manner in which the
premises” were maintained. See Exhibit A at §{j 6,7.
Plaintiff and Defendant were parties to a “Release and Indemnification Agreement” (the
“Release”) that was signed on December 18, 2021. See Release and Indemnification
Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6. The Release describes the Type of “Risks Associated with Activities” and provides:
2.1 Risks Associated with Activities. Participant acknowledges
there are inherent risks in and injuries that may occur from
participating in the Activities, including, but not limited to,
equipment malfunction; defective design or manufacture of
equipment; improper or negligent installation of equipment;
negligent maintenance of equipment; cuts; bruises; muscle strain;
twisted or sprained
ankles, knees, shoulders, or wrists; burns; dirt or other materials in
eye; concussions; broken bones; physical or emotional injuries;
landing wrong; over-exertion; failure of the attraction surface or
attachments; being hit by a ball; collisions with other participants;
erratic co-participant behavior; collisions with standards and
supports; using improper form or technique; slipping, falling, or
tripping;
equipment failure; error of judgment by employees; paralysis,
disability, or death; personal injury to third persons; or property
damage. When skydiving, the most common risk of injury is to the
shoulders due to the force of the air on them. When participating in
cyber or e-sports, the most common risk of injury is a seizure due
to epilepsy. Due to the nature of the Activities, there are more
hazards and risks than the foregoing, and there are also unknown
and unforeseeable hazards. If you have any questions, please
contact a manager before purchasing admission.
See Exhibit B at J 2.1
The Release describes the “Nature of the Activities” that occur at the Property and it
explicitly includes “the opportunity to participate actively or passively, in...
jumping...tumbling...foam pit jumping...ninja warrior course...activities”. See Exhibit B
atl.
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8. The Release contains a “Dispute Resolution” section which lists arbitration as the venue for
“any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement”. See Exhibit B at 4 7(A).
9. Specifically, it provides:
7.a. Dispute Resolution
a. ARBITRATION. ANY DISPUTE OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT, BREACH THEREOF, THE PREMISES,
ACTIVITIES, PROPERTY DAMAGE (REAL OR PERSONAL), PERSONAL
INJURY (INCLUDING DEATH), OR THE SCOPE, ARBITRABILITY, OR
VALIDITY OF THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (DISPUTE) SHALL BE
BROUGHT BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND NOT
AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY, AND SETTLED BY BINDING
ARBITRATION BEFORE A SINGLE ARBITRATOR ADMINISTERED BY THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (AAA) PER ITS COMMERCIAL
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE DEMAND
FOR ARBITRATION IS FILED. JUDGMENT ON THE ARBITRATION AWARD
MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY FEDERAL OR STATE COURT HAVING
JURISDICTION THEREOF. NO AWARD SHALL EXCEED THE AMOUNT OF
THE CLAIM BY EITHER PARTY AND THE ARBITRATOR SHALL HAVE NO
AUTHORITY TO AWARD PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. IF THE
DISPUTE CANNOT BE HEARD BY THE AAA FOR ANY REASON, THE
DISPUTE SHALL BE HEARD BY AN ARBITRATOR MUTUALLY SELECTED
BY THE PARTIES. IF THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE UPON AN
ARBITRATOR, THEN EITHER PARTY MAY PETITION AN APPROPRIATE
COURT TO APPOINT AN ARBITRATOR. ARBITRATION AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF ANY AWARD RENDERED IN THE ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE SUBJECT TO AND GOVERNED BY 9 U.S.C. § 1 ET
SEQ. IF EITHER PARTY FILES SUIT IN VIOLATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH
(EXCEPT TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS), SUCH PARTY SHALL
REIMBURSE THE OTHER FOR THEIR COSTS AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING
ATTORNEYS’ FEES, INCURRED IN SEEKING ABATEMENT OF SUCH SUIT
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THIS PARAGRAPH.
10. The Release contains a “Waiver of Jury Trial” section which states that Plaintiff has
agreed to “waive their right to a jury trial of any dispute and to resolve any and all disputes
through arbitration”. See Exhibit B at § 7(B).
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11 Plaintiff's name, Diego Rey, and date of birth, March 5, 2013, are listed on the Release.
See Exhibit B.
12. Plaintiff's mother, Marisol De Rey, is also listed on the Release along with her date of
birth, December 08, 1987. See Exhibit B.
13 Defendant subsequently moved to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Proceedings. [See
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay, attached as Exhibit C].
14 After a hearing, this Court deferred ruling and ordered limited discovery.
15 This Court held a hearing on June 21, 2023.
16. At the hearing, this Court inquired with respect to arbitration agreements,
No, but do you have to know exactly what it says, is
the question, Do you know exactly what it says
inside?
ook
I mean, it’s not—it’s whatever it says. If it says, if
you’re in a situation and you sign it, if your kid is at
a park and they’re asking—and you’re asking to go
in, you have to sign something and it’s put in front
of your face and you sign it, you’re—you know,
you have to arbitrate.
[See Transcript of hearing, attached as Exhibit D at page 7:5-20].
17. The Court was further concerned with the fact that a potential Plaintiff was “giving up a lot
of rights within two minutes.” [See Exhibit D at page 9:20-25]. The Court stated that it
needed to know if all that was necessary for a valid arbitration agreement was whether it
signed. [See Exhibit D at page 19:14-25, 20:1-8].
18. As will be discussed below, all that is required for a valid arbitration agreement is a
signature obtained free of fraud or coercion.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
For brevity’s sake, this memorandum will only focus on the narrow issues identified at
the June 21 hearing and in Plaintiff's July 20° 2023 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Compel Arbitration, attached hereto as Exhibit “E”. However, to the extent necessary,
Defendant’s hereby incorporate its earlier Motion to Compel Arbitration. As set forth above,
this Court has requested authority as to whether the circumstances surrounding an arbitration
agreement affect its validity, particularly in a non-commercial.
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution requires the courts of this state to be
“open to every person for redress of any injury.” See Infinity Design Builders, Inc. v.
Hutchinson, 964 So. 2d 752, 755 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Jd. As with any other constitutional
right, the right of access to the courts may be relinquished. Jd. In deciding whether arbitration is
required, therefore, one must necessarily begin by asking whether the parties contractually
agreed to arbitrate. Jd. If they did not, then unless there is a waiver of the right, Article I, section
21 requires submission of the legal dispute to the courts. Jd. The agreement ofa party to submit
to arbitration is sufficient consideration to support the other party's agreement to do the same.
See Kinko's, Inc. v. Payne, 901 So. 2d 354, 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Also, the court should
“resolve any doubt concerning the scope of the provisions in favor of arbitration and ... give
harmonious effect to all the terms.” See Spring Lake NC, LLC v. Figueroa, 104 So. 3d 1211,
1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
In challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement, a party must assert defenses
applicable to all contracts—defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” SA-PG Sun
City Ctr., LLC v. Kennedy, 79 So. 3d 916, 919 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). The court requires a party
asserting the defense of unconscionability to demonstrate both procedural and substantive
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unconscionability. Jd. If a court determines that the arbitration agreement is not procedurally
unconscionable, then it does not need to reach the issue of substantive unconscionability. Jd.
To determine whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable, a court must decide
whether the complaining party had a meaningful choice at the time the contract was signed. Brea
Sarasota, LLC v. Bickel, 95 So. 3d 1015, 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012);Gainesville Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The court should consider
factors such as “whether the complaining party had a realistic opportunity to bargain regarding
the terms of the contract, or whether the terms were merely presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’
basis; and whether he or she had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contract.” Jd. However, a party to a contract is not “permitted to avoid the consequences ofa
contract freely entered into simply because he or she elected not to read and understand its terms
before executing it, or because, in retrospect, the bargain turns out to be disadvantageous.” Jd.
It also cannot be emphasized enough that that the party seeking to avoid the arbitration
provision on the ground of unconscionability, has the burden to present evidence sufficient to
support that claim. SA-PG Sun City Ctr., LLC v. Kennedy, 79 So. 3d 916, 919 (Fla. 2d DCA
2012). Almost universally, courts have been unwilling to overturn contracts where a party signs
a contract containing an arbitration provision without a showing of coercion or some other under
influence, despite admittedly harsh results. The seminal case on this issue is Estate of Etting ex
rel. Etting v. Regents Park at Aventura, Inc., 891 So. 2d 558, 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). In that
case, the plaintiff argues that since the decedent, his mother, was legally blind at the time that she
signed the agreement with the nursing home, that the agreement and its arbitration clause was
invalid. Jd. The appellate court upheld the arbitration agreement and held “[i]t has long been
held in Florida that one is bound by his contract. Unless one can show facts and circumstances to
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demonstrate that he was prevented from reading the contract, or that he was induced by
statements of the other party to refrain from reading the contract it is binding.” Jd.
Similarly, in Spring Lake NC, LLC v. Holloway, 110 So. 3d 916, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA
2013), the court found that a nursing home resident was bound by a contract containing an
arbitration agreement, despite the fact that she was 92 years old, had a fourth-grade education
and limited reading ability because there was no evidence that the admissions staff at the nursing
home used any improper methods to obtain the signature or that she was misled in any fashion.
The court further held that limited abilities are not a basis to prevent the enforceability of the
contract. Jd. Likewise, in Brea Sarasota, LLC v. Bickel, 95 So. 3d 1015, 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA
2012), it was no excuse that the plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement “under the stress of the
moment,” when she was otherwise unable to demonstrate that she was prevented from knowing
its contents.
Likewise, arbitration agreements are upheld where a party signs a contract containing an
arbitration agreement without reading it, unless the party seeking to enforce it did something
affirmatively to prevent it from being read or understood. See Rocky Creek Ret. Properties, Inc.
v. Estate of Fox ex rel. Bank of Am., N.A., 19 So. 3d 1105, 1108-09 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
(plaintiffs alleged inability to understand the arbitration agreement does not vitiate her assent to
that agreement in the absence of some evidence that she was prevented from knowing its
contents since Florida law has long held that a party to a contract is “conclusively presumed to
know and understand the contents, terms, and conditions of the contract.”); SA-PG Sun City Ctr.,
LLC v. Kennedy, 79 So. 3d 916, 919-20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (arbitration agreement upheld
where signatory failed to indicate that she had any difficulty in reading the arbitration agreement,
and despite an opportunity to ask questions, failed to do so and there was no evidence
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demonstrating that she was coerced into signing or prevented from understanding the contents of
the arbitration agreement); Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 287-88
(Fla. lst DCA 2003)(plaintiff “ample opportunity” to read the documents before she executed
them and that, had she been uncomfortable with them, she might have taken them home to study
or discuss, she asked no questions about the arbitration provision and said or did nothing to
indicate she had not read and understood that provision before she executed the contract); see
also Kendall Imports, LLC v. Diaz, 215 So. 3d 95, 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)(arbitration
agreement upheld where buyers admitted that they signed the documents in question without
attempting to read them or learn what they were agreeing to, with the exception of the financial
terms, such as the costs, monthly payments, etc; they did not tell anyone they could not read the
documents they were signing because they did not speak or read English, and there is no
evidence that defendant’s employees were even aware that the Buyers could not and did not read
the documents). And “[t]his is true whether a party is physically unable to read the agreement or
simply chooses not to read the agreement.” See Kennedy, 79 So. 3d 916 at (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
In conclusion, as set forth, the agreement of a party to submit to arbitration is sufficient
consideration to support the other party's agreement to do the same. See Kinko's, Inc. v. Payne,
901 So. at 355. Further, the party seeking to enforce a contract does not need to do anything
other than present a contract for signature and obtain same. This is true regardless of whether
the individual may have limited reading or language skills. In other words, the party seeking
enforcement need not ensure that the signatory understands the contents or the arbitration
agreement or its consequences. Here, Plaintiff has been deposed and her testimony is
completely lacking any evidence of coercion or some other under influence which would
invalidate the contract which contains the arbitration agreement. [See deposition of Marisol
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Escobar, attached as Exhibit “F”]. Further, Plaintiff has failed to allege, much less prove fraud,
unconscionable or duress. Rather, it appears Plaintiff signed the contract without asking
questions or even taking the time to understand what she was signing. She has presented no
evidence, despite having been deposed, that she was pressured or that she even inquired whether
she could enter into the contract without agreeing to arbitration. As set forth above, a party
cannot be relieved of its contractual obligations under such circumstances.
Further, to briefly recap what was set forth in its previous motion to compel arbitration
and to respond to Plaintiff's opposition to same, Defendant is otherwise legally entitled to
arbitration. In determining whether to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties' agreement, a
court must consider three elements: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2)
whether an arbitratable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived. See
Glob. Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2005). Here, as previously set forth,
a valid agreement exists. Further, Ms. Escobar’s acceptance of the arbitration agreement was
sufficient to bind her son, Diego. See Glob. Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 404 (Fla.
2005) (parents' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 23 encompasses
decisions on the activities appropriate for their children—whether they be academically or
socially focused pursuits, physically rigorous activities such as football, adventure sports such as
skiing, horseback riding, or mountain climbing, or, as in this case, an adventure vacation in a
game reserve. Parents who choose to allow their children to engage in these activities may also
legitimately elect on their children's behalf to agree in advance to arbitrate a resulting tort claim
if the risks of these activities are realized.”)!
‘Plaintiffs have filed two responses in opposition to Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration
and stay and both are unavailing. The first response was filed on March 8, 2023 and dealt with
exculpatory clauses, which has nothing to do with the motion to compel arbitration and how this
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ON July 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration. [See Response to Motion to compel, dated July 20, 2023, attached
as Exhibit “G”], In this memorandum Plaintiff claims that he is not subject to the arbitration
provision “because the injury was caused by lack of maintenance and failure to maintain the
equipment which is not within the scope of what was contented in the Arbitration provision.”
Plaintiff's argument is without merit. In this motion, Plaintiff correctly states that only those
claims which the parties have agreed to arbitration may be subject to arbitration. However,
Plaintiff is incorrect when he states, “that neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant can claims that
they intended to bring to Arbitrate an incident, a Tort stemming from lack of maintenance and
failure to warn of the danger that resulted in the injury to Plaintiff, DEIGO REY, a minor”
To start, when the language of a contract, such as the arbitration agreement, is clear and
unambiguous, courts must give effect to the contract as written and cannot engage in
interpretation or construction as the plain language is the best evidence of the parties' intent. See
Talbott v. First Bank Florida, FSB, 59 So. 3d 243, 245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
Here, the arbitration agreement expressly provides:
ANY DISPUTE OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT, BREACH THEREOF,
THE PREMISES, ACTIVITIES, PROPERTY DAMAGE
(REAL OR PERSONAL), PERSONAL INJURY
INCLUDING DEATH OR THE SCOPE,
ARBITRABILITY, OR VALIDITY OF THIS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (DISPUTE) SHALL BE
BROUGHT BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY AND NOT AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS
MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY, AND SETTLED BY
BINDING ARBITRATION BEFORE A SINGLE
ARBITRATOR ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN
Court should decide the issue. [See Response to motion to compel dated March 8, 2023,
attached as Exhibit “H”].
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ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (AAA) PER ITS
COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES IN
EFFECT AT THE TIME THE DEMAND FOR
ARBITRATION IS FILED. JUDGMENT ON THE
ARBITRATION AWARD MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY
FEDERAL OR STATE COURT HAVING JURISDICTION
THEREOF.
Thus, because the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement provides that any claim arising
out of the premises or personal injury must be disposed of by binding arbitration, Plaintiff's assertion that the
parties did not intent for this suit to be subject to arbitration is simply without merit. In her motion,
Plaintiff relies heavily on Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999).
However, it is well-recognized that Seifert did not hold that wrongful death claims are not
arbitratable. Rather, the holding in Seifert is limited since that case concluded that an arbitration
provision in a homebuyer's contract, which did not refer to tort claims for personal injuries, did
not require arbitration of such disputes. See Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 44 So. 3d 1254,
1258 (Fla. Sth DCA 2010), approved, 109 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2013). For this reason, Plaintiff's
reliance on Terminix Intern. Co., L.P. v. Michaels, 668 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996),
is not dispositive since the arbitration provision in that case did not refer to and therefore did not
encompass tort claims.
Moreover, it is also well-settled Florida law that where as here, an arbitration provision is
clear that it encompasses personal injury or negligence claims, it should be upheld and the case
should be compelled to arbitration. See Laizure, 44 So. 3d at 1258 (upheld and enforced
arbitration provision which provided that “any claim based on common law or statutory
negligence, gross negligence, malpractice or a claim based on any departure from accepted
standards of medical or nursing care....” was subject to arbitration); see also Gordon v. DOS of
Crystal River ALF, LLC, 323 So. 3d 815, 816 (Fla. Sth DCA 2021), review denied, SC21-1108,
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CASE NO. 2022-02095 1-CA-25
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2021 WL 5625398 (Fla. Dec. 1, 2021) (upheld arbitration agreement where encompassed
“breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud or misrepresentation, common law or
statutory negligence, gross negligence, malpractice or any other claim based on any departure
from accepted standards of medical or nursing care.”); BKD Twenty-One Mgmt. Co., Inc. v.
Delsordo, 127 So. 3d 527, 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)(court compelled arbitration where “[uJnlike
the arbitration provision in Seifert which had no indication that it applied to independent tort
claims, the arbitration agreement in the case at bar expressly applies to negligence claims.”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant
its motion, stay the proceedings, enter an order compelling arbitration, further requiring no
further action in this matter from this Defendant until the arbitration is complete, and any other
such relief as the Court deems just and proper.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was electronically
served via the Florida Court’s e-Filing Portal system on this 31st day of July, 2023 to counsel of
record listed on the attached Service List.
KUBICKI DRAPER
Counsel for Defendant
9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1800
Miami, Florida 33156
Direct Line: (305) 982-6774
PSB-KD@kubickidraper.com (eService
Only)
BY: /s/ Peter Baumberger
PETER S. BAUMBERGER, ESQ.
Florida Bar No.: 117803
PSB@kubickidraper.com (Direct)
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CASE NO. 2022-02095 1-CA-25
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SERVICE LIST
Mario Serralta, Esq.,
Mario Serralta & Associates
7900 Oak Lane, Suite 301
Miami Lakes, Florida 33016
Telephone No.: 305-326-0501
Email: jb@helpmemario.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
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Filing # 160389920 E-Filed 11/01/2022 01:33:05 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.:
MARISOL ESCOBAR, as Mother
and Natural Guardian of her minor
Child, DIEGO REY, In and for COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
DIEGO REY AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff,
Vs.
ARILAR GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
if
Plaintiff, MARISOL ESCOBAR, as Mother and Natural Guardian of her minor child,
DIEGO REY, in and for DIEGO REY, (hereinafter referred to as “DIEGO REY, a minor”), by
and through her attorneys, Mario Serralta & Associates, sues the Defendant, ARILAR GROUP,
LLC, and alleges as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1 ‘That the amount in controversy is in excess of thirty thousand ($30,000.00) dollars,
exclusive of interest and costs.
2, Atall times material to this complaint, Plaintiff, MARISOL ESCOBAR, as Mother
and Natural Guardian of her minor child, DIEGO REY, was and is a resident of Miami-Dade
County, Florida, and is otherwise sui juris.
3 At all times material hereto, MARISOL ESCOBAR, is the mother and natural
guardian of her minor son, DIEGO REY.
4. At all times material hereto, MARISOL REY, brings this action as the mother and
natural guardian of her minor daughter, IIABELLA MARTIN, pursuant to 1.210(b), Florida
Exhibit A
Rule of Civil Procedure.
5 At all times material to this complaint, Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC, upon
information and belief, was and is a Florida corporation or other business entity authorized to do
business in the State of Florida, and doing business in Miami-Dade County, Florida.
6 On or about December 18, 2021, Plaintiff, DIEGO REY, a minor, was lawfully on
the premises of Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC, located at Urban Air Trampoline and
Adventure Park 15625 SW 88" Street, in the City of Miami, Miami-Dade County, Florida 33196,
and was a business invitee when he was seriously injured by a metal object that was sticking out in
the play area causing a facial laceration to Plaintiff.
COUNT I- NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff, DIEGO REY, a minor by and through mother and guardian MARISOL
ESCOBAR, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby repeats and re-alleges each and every
allegation set forth above and further complains against Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC, as
follows:
7 At the aforementioned time and place, Plaintiff, DIEGO REY, a minor, was injured
due to the negligent and careless manner in which the premises of the Defendant, ARILAR
GROUP, LLC, was maintained.
8 At all times material to this complaint, Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC, had
entire or partial control of the premises mentioned above, and in particular the area where Plaintiff,
DIEGO REY, a minor, was traversing during his visit to Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC’s,
premises.
9 Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC, owed a duty to Plaintiff, DIEGO REY, a
minor, and to the general public using the aforementioned premises, to keep said premises in a
reasonably safe condition for people lawfully on said premises.
10. Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC, breached the duty owed to the Plaintiff,
DIEGO REY, a minor, by committing one of the following acts of commission and/or omission.
a) Defendant, by and through its agents, servants and/or employees allowed a
dangerous and defective condition to be created, to wit: Plaintiff was a
business invitee when he was seriously injured by a metal object in the play
area causing a facial laceration to Plaintiff}
b) Defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known,
of the existence of said dangerous and defective condition;
°) Defendant failed to warn Plaintiff of any such danger or in the alternative,
Defendant allowed said dangerous and defective condition to exist for a
length of time sufficient
d) Defendant failed to keep the aforementioned area of the premises maintained
in a safe and proper condition for use by persons lawfully on the premises;
¢) Defendant failed to post any barriers or warnings of a dangerous condition;
Defendant failed to properly supervise and monitor the dangerous condition
although Defendant knew or should have known that the condition was
dangerous to persons lawfully on the premises.
1, As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant, ARILAR GROUP,
LLC, its agents, servants and/or employees, as set forth above, Plaintiff, DIEGO REY, a minor, has
suffered serious and permanent personal injury in and about his body and extremities. Moreover, he
did in the past, and will in the future, suffer damages, including but not limited to, the following:
A. Bodily Injuries;
Pain and suffering;
Disability, both temporary and permanent, within a reasonable
degree of medical probability;
Disfigurement;
Mental Anguish;
Lost capacity for the enjoyment of life;
Loss of earnings;
Loss of earning capacity;
Significant medical expenses occurred in the treatment of related
injuries;
J. Aggravation of a pre-existing condition.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, DIEGO REY, a minor, demands judgment for damages against
the Defendant, ARILAR GROUP, LLC, in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this
court, together with such costs and such other further relief as the court may deem just and proper
and further demands trial by jury of all issues triable as a right.
Respectfully submitted,
MARIO SERRALTA & ASSOCIATES
7900 OAK LANE, SUITE 301
MIAMI LAKES, FLORIDA 33016
TELEPHONE NO.: (305) 326-0501
FACSIMILE NO.: (305) 326-1898
E-MAIL: ib@helpmemarig.som
MARIO SERRALTA, ESQUIRE
FLORIDA BAR NUMBER: 163317
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