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Filing # 168620600 E-Filed 03/13/2023 04:33:58 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA
NIKITA S. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff, CASE NO: 2021 CA 1380
VS.
WALMART STORES EAST, LP
d/b/a WALMART SUPERCENTER
#919,
Defendants.
/
NOTICE OF FILING
COME(S) NOW the Plaintiff, NIKITA S. PATTERSON, by and through the undersigned
attorneys, and gives notice to of filing the following documents, to be filed in this action:
1 Case Law in support of Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, dated March 10, 2023.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Thereby certify that a copy of the forgoing has been provided to Andrew Talbert and
Tricia Payne of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., by Florida Courts E-Filing Portal and
via email to atalbert.pleadings@qpwblaw.com; tstafford.pleadings@qpwblaw.com; and
dshally@qpwblaw.com; Jennifer.biskner@qpwblaw.com on this 13th day of March, 2023.
/s/ Evin Childs
EVIN CHILDS
FL Bar No.: 64795
MORGAN & MORGAN
220 West Garden Street, 9" Floor
Pensacola, FL 32502
Telephone: 850-876-7806
Facsimile: 850-876-7830
echilds@forthepeople.com
dcohoon@forthepeople.com
Attorney for the Plaintiff Nikita Patterson
American Hospitality Management Co. of Minnesota v. Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005)
30 Fla. leekly D1
jury as to a rebuttable presumption *548 of negligence. We
904 So.2d 547 agree and reverse.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
The repairman accompanied other air conditioning service
AMERICAN HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT personnel to a Holiday Inn. The repairman borrowed a ladder
COMPANY OF MINNESOTA, Appellant, from the hotel operator to do the repairs. While using the
Vv ladder he fell from it and sustained severe injuries. That same
day, the hotel operator destroyed the ladder.
Edward P. HETTIGER, III, Appellee.
No. 4D03-2001 The repairman sued the hotel operator in negligence and
| for spoliation of evidence. Before trial he filed a motion
June 1, 2005. for summary judgment on his spoliation of evidence claim
| or, alternatively, for an appropriate trial remedy. He argued
Rehearing Denied July 15, 2005. that if the ladder were available his expert could testify as
to the defect in the ladder, that without the ladder he was
Synopsis now at a disadvantage in that he could not prove his claim
Background: Repairman who was injured on hotel's of negligence. He also pointed out that, with the ladder
premises while using one of hotel's ladders brought action destroyed, the hotel could even argue that the ladder had not
against hotel operator for negligence and for spoliation been shown to have been defective.
of evidence. The Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit, Palm Beach County, Art Wroble, J., ruled in favor of In response, defendant argued that the hotel had no notice that
repairman, and hotel operator appealed. a claim was imminent, such as a letter from plaintiff advising
of a claim and identifying the evidence to be preserved. Nor
was there any evidence that the loss of the ladder affected
plaintiff's ability to prove his claim; hotel employees had
The District Court of Appeal, Farmer, C.J., held that, because
testified in deposition that they knew the ladder was old and
the jury instruction actually given at trial erroneously treated
that a cross support was broken. Following the arguments
the matter as a presumption and unfairly shifted the burden of
the court announced it would deny the motion for summary
proof as to negligence in the first instance to hotel operator,
judgment on the spoliation claim, but would instruct the jury
case would be remanded.
as to a rebuttable presumption of negligence.
Reversed. At trial, the Judge instructed the jury as follows:
“The Court has determined and now instructs you, as a
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal.
matter of law, that American Hospitality is responsible for
Attorneys and Law Firms any negligence of the Holiday Inn Express agents and/or
employees.
*547 Bard D. Rockenbach, West Palm Beach, and F. Neal
Colvin of the Law Offices of Peter J. Delahunty, Palm Beach The defendant, American Hospitality disposed of the
Gardens, for appellant. ladder involved in plaintiff, Edward Hettiger's claim on the
date that he was injured. The disposal makes it difficult
Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Fountain & for the plaintiff to prove that American Hospitality was
Williams, L.L.P., West Palm Beach, for appellee. negligent with regard to the ladder in its condition or that
such a condition caused plaintiff's injury.
Opinion
In situations such as this, the Court has the discretion
FARMER, C.J.
to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff, Edward
A hotel operator appeals a mid-trial ruling in favor of a Hettiger, to defendant, American Hospitality. The Court
repairman injured on its premises while using one of its has done so.
ladders. It argues that the trial court erred by instructing the
American Hospitality ManagementCi f Minnesota Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005)
se
ekly
Here, the hotel operator contends that it had no specific
As a result of American Hospitality destroying the ladder legal or contractual duty to preserve the ladder after the fall.
which is the subject of this lawsuit, the Court has entered It claims that it had no notice that a claim was imminent.
a presumption of negligence against Holiday Inn and has Moreover, it argues, even if it had a duty to preserve the ladder
determined as a matter of law the following: the repairman failed to establish that the destruction impaired
his ability to build a prima facie case of negligence. The trial
1, the ladder is presumed to be defective.
court found that the Valcin instruction was warranted because
2, the defective ladder is presumed to have caused Edward the hotel operator had disposed of the ladder on the day of
Hettiger to fall. the fall and injury, and that loss impaired the repairman's
ability to have the ladder tested to show that it was seriously
This is a rebuttable presumption of negligence and the deteriorated and dangerous to use.
burden is on the defendant to overcome this presumption
by the greater weight of the evidence. In the context of a claim for spoliation of evidence other
than medical records, we have held that a defendant could
If the defendant does not meet this burden by the greater
be charged with a duty to preserve evidence where it could
weight of the evidence, then you must find the defendant
reasonably have foreseen the claim. See Hagopian y. Publix
negligent. This ruling does not eliminate defendant's right
Supermarkets, Inc., 788 $0.24 1088, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA
to prove negligence on the part of other parties involved in
2001), review denied, 817 So.2d 849 (Fla.2002) (recognizing
this case, whether named or not, as well as presenting proof
retail establishment's duty to preserve evidence even without
to rebut the presumption of negligence I have instructed
a contractual, statutory or administrative duty). Although
you on.”
this is not a products liability claim directly against a
manufacturer, plaintiff's claim was founded on an allegation
Defendant argues that this instruction went too far, that it
that the hotel operator knew that the ladder was dangerous to
assumed the truth of disputed facts and interfered with the
use. Under this circumstance a finder of fact could reasonably
jury's function of resolving conflicts in the evidence. Plaintiff
conclude that its unavailability was something other than
argues that this issue was not preserved. We disagree with
fortuitous.
plaintiff as to the preservation issue, finding (without further
elaboration) the question *549 adequately preserved at all
We agree with plaintiff that the ladder was conceivably
critical steps.
critical to its claim against the hotel operator. Our concern
is with the nature of the instruction given to the jury. The
Plaintiff contends that this issue is, or should be, governed
effect of the instruction was to have the jury begin with a
by Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 $0.24
presumption that defendant was negligent in its provision of
596 (Fla.1987). In that case, the court adopted a rebuttable
the ladder and to shift the burden of proof to the defendant
presumption of negligence when a health care provider is
to disprove any negligence. We think the court erred in this
unable to produce essential medical records in a medical
malpractice action. One court has held that the destruction regard.
of critical evidence in a products liability action may give
The Valcin remedy should not have been employed. Valcin
rise to a Valcin instruction, where the party had destroyed the
evidence during pretrial testing of the product in spite of an involved a patient's medical malpractice claim against a
hospital for negligent performance of tubal ligation surgery.
agreement with the opposing party not to do so and to return it
It turned out that the surgeon's report of the operation was
in the same condition in which it had been received before the
lost, and that omission hindered plaintiff in proving the
testing. Rochovell Int‘. Corp. v. Menzies, 561 So.2d 677 (Fla.
claim of negligent surgery. The lost notes of the surgical
3d DCA 1990). We have refused to apply Valcin in medical
procedure were not ordinary business records or, as here,
malpractice litigation where the missing medical records were
equipment. They were a patient's medical records. As the
of marginal importance and could not have hindered plaintiff
Third District noted on direct appeal in Valcin, Florida law
in proving the claim. See Anesthesiology Critical Care & Pain
Memt. Consultants, PA. v. Kretzer, 802 So0.2d 346, 349 (Fla. requires the health care provider to furnish a patient's health
care records upon request. alein v. Public Health Trust of
4th DCA 2001).
Dade County, 473 So.2d 1297, 1306. n. 7 (Fla, 3d DCA
1984); see also *550 § 395,202, Fla. Stat. (1981). Moreover,
American Hospitality ManagementCi f Minnesota Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005)
se
ekly
Florida law requires a provider to maintain, among other presumption and an inference, noting that a presumption is
things, “medical and surgical treatment notes and reports.” stronger and compels the jury to find the presumed fact if
As Judge Pearson put it, “it is clear to us that the hospital's the prescribed circumstances are present. Jd. at 582. Palmas
failure to have maintained and produced a record of Valcin's emphasized that an inference differs qualitatively from the
surgical procedure is a breach of a duty owing to her which Valcin presumption, which functions to shift the burden
cannot go unnoticed and, most assuredly, which cannot inure entirely as to controverted fact. A jury may accept or reject an
to the hospital's benefit.” fd. at 1306; see also Fla. Admin. inference as it sees fit. Because the lost test results were not
Code Ch. 10D-28.59(3). In short the remedy of a rebuttable crucial to plaintiff's case, the court ruled that any instruction
presumption was fashioned in part because of the unique even as to an inference was error in Palmas. Id. at 582-83.
duties of health care practitioners with regard to patient's
medical records. That circumstance is not present in the case Unlike Jordan and Palmas, the lost ladder in this case
we face today. was conceivably crucial. Plaintiff argues that it was the very
instrument of his fall, and its condition was critical to the
We think this case falls more logically under our own decision question whether the hotel operator was negligent in allowing
in Jordan ex rel. Shealey v. Masters, 821 $0.24 3 2, 346 (Fla. its use. We do not think it is per se error to give a jury
4th DCA 2002), and that of the Third District in Palma: 3y instruction as to an adverse inference. In circumstances where
Bambu, S.A. v. EJ. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 881 $0.2d the lost evidence was under the sole control of the party
565 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Jordan involved the failure of a against whom the evidence might have been used to effect,
party to produce a videotape of an incident, evidence of which and where the lost evidence is in fact critical to prove the other
had already been presented by audiotape at trial. The court party's claim, an adverse *551 inference instruction may be
gave an adverse inference instruction whereby the jury could necessary to achieve justice in the jury's determination of the
infer the critical fact against the party failing to produce the case. This would be true where the party failing to preserve
videotape that had been within its control. Palmas involved the evidence argues that the thing lost was not as represented
a products liability claim in which DuPont conducted its by the injured party, or that the injured party should not prevail
own tests regarding the product during the litigation and then because of the failure to present the evidence foreclosed by
destroyed the evidence of the test and its results. Finding this the loss of the item.
destruction in violation of a duty to preserve the evidence,
the court gave the jury an adverse inference instruction that Here at any trial on remand, it may be proper to instruct the
the jury could infer that the test results were unfavorable to jury that they are free to draw an inference of negligence if the
DuPont. hotel operator's destruction of the ladder affected plaintiff's
case unfairly. We leave that decision initially in the hands
On appeal in Jordan, Judge Warner wrote that “[w]e have of the trial court. If the court decides that justice requires
found no case approving an instruction for an adverse an adverse inference instruction, and makes its reasoning
inference to be drawn from the failure to produce evidence.” apparent on the record, we suggest (but do not require) that
821 So.2d at 346. Noting that an inference is a determination the court consider something like this edited example from
of one fact from the existence of another fact, we quoted Palmas:
Ehrhardt for the proposition that it is for the trier of fact
to make the determination whether the inferred fact will be
determined. /d.; see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, FLORIDA You have heard testimony about potential evidence which
EVIDENCE § 301.1 (2001 ed.). We held that “[flor the court the party having custody failed to produce. Plaintiffs have
to tell a jury that an adverse inference may be drawn from the argued that this evidence was in defendant's control and
failure to produce evidence invades the province of the jury.” would have proven facts material to the issue of negligence.
Jordan, 821 So.2d at 346,
If you find that this evidence was then within defendant's
In Palmas the Third District emphasized that jury instructions control, that defendant could have preserved this evidence
must not assume the truth of controverted facts and that so that it was available for the parties in preparing for
ordinarily a court interferes with the jury's function when it trial in this case, and that this evidence would have been
gives an instruction about specific facts that are controverted. material in deciding the facts in dispute in this case, then
881 So.2d at 580. Palmas also drew a distinction between a you are permitted, but are not required, to infer that the
evidence would have been unfavorable to defendant.
American Hospitality Management Co. of Minnesota v. Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005)
30 Fla. eeklyD4
Any inference you decide to make should be based on all
Reversed.
of the facts and circumstances in this case.
Palmas, 881 So.2d at 581 (adapted from Gilbert v. Cosco Inc.,
989 F.2d 399, 405 n. 5 (10th Cir, 1993). STONE and MAY, JJ., concur.
Because the jury instruction actually given at trial
erroneously treated the matter as a presumption and unfairly All Citations
shifted the burden of proof as to negligence in the first
instance to the defendant we remand the case to the trial court 904 So.2d 547, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D1381
for a new trial.
Footnotes
We note that this case was decided by the jury on the negligence claim only. In the meantime, we have
determined that in a first party case plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain both negligence and spoliation
claims against the same defendant. Safeguard Mgt., Inc. v. Pinedo, 865 So.2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), and
Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 835 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Our remand is therefore limited to
the negligence claim only. The citation to Valcin in Safeguard should not be misunderstood as authorizing
the presumption of negligence employed in Valcin. Indeed Judge Stevenson's opinion in Safeguard speaks
several times of an adverse inference, not of a presumption.
ve ~
End of Document © 2023 Thomson Reuiers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby In 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
ery.
described as a “citizens' lobby” and its founder, filed a libel
106 S.Ct. 2505 action in Federal District Court against petitioners, alleging
Supreme Court of the United States that certain statements in a magazine published by petitioners
were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners
jack ANDERSON, et al., Petitioners moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
v. Civil Procedure 56, asserting that because respondents were
LIBERTY LOBBY, INC. and Willis A. Carto. public figures they were required to prove their case under the
New York Times standards and that summary judgment was
No. 84-1602 proper because actual malice was absent as a matter of law in
| view of an affidavit by the author of the articles in question
Argued Dec. 3, 1985. that they had been thoroughly researched and that the facts
| were obtained from numerous sources. Opposing the motion,
Decided June 25, 1986. respondents claimed that an issue of actual malice was
presented because the author had relied on patently unreliable
Synopsis sources in preparing the articles. After holding that New
Libel action was brought against magazine, its publisher, and York Times applied because respondents were limited-purpose
its chief executive officer. The United States District Court for public figures, the District Court entered summary judgment
the District of Columbia, 562 F.Supp. 201, granted summary for petitioners on the ground that the author's investigation
judgment in favor of defendants and plaintiffs appealed. The and research and his reliance on numerous sources precluded
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 746 a finding of actual malice. Reversing as to certain of the
F.2d, 1563, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme allegedly defamatory statements, the Court of Appeals held
Court, Justice White, held that: (1) ruling on motion for that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and
summary judgment or directed verdict necessarily implicates convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary
that substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would judgment stage, and that with respect to those statements
apply at a trial on the merits, and (2) when determining if summary judgment had been improperly granted because a
genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists in a libel suit jury could reasonably have concluded that the allegations
brought by a public figure, trial judge must bear in mind were defamatory, false, and made with actual malice.
the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support
liability under the New York Times doctrine. Held: The Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard
in reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment.
Vacated and remanded. Pp. 2509-2515.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion. (a) Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is “genuine,” that is, if the evidence is such that
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
Justice Burger joined. party. At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge's
function is not himself to weigh the evidence and *243
Procedural Posture(s): Motion for Summary Judgment. determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no such issue unless
there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for
**2506 *242 Syllabus”
a jury to return a verdict for that party. In essence, the inquiry
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US, 284, 84 is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, it was held that, in a libel suit require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
brought by a public official (extended by later cases to one party must prevail as a matter of law. Pp. 2509-2512.
public figures), the First Amendment requires **2507 the
plaintiff to show that in publishing the alleged defamatory (b) A trial court ruling on a motion for summary judgment ina
statement the defendant acted with actual malice. It was case such as this must be guided by the New York Times “clear
further held that such actual malice must be shown with and convincing” evidentiary standard in determining whether
“convincing clarity.” Respondents, a nonprofit corporation a genuine issue of actual malice exists, that is, whether the
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ATT US, 242 (1986)
106. 05, 9 Us| 4755, Fed.R.Ser
evidence is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254, 279-280,
malice had been shown with convincing clarity. Pp. 2512- 84 S.Ct. 710, 72. 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), we held
2514. that, in a libel suit brought by a public official, the First
Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that in publishing
(c) A plaintiff may not defeat a defendant's properly supported the defamatory statement the defendant acted with actual
motion for summary judgment in a libel case such as this malice—“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
one without offering any concrete evidence from which a disregard of whether it was false or not.” We held further that
reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor and by such actual malice must be shown with “convincing clarity.”
merely asserting that the jury might disbelieve the defendant's Ad., at 285-286, 84 S.Ct, at 728-729, See also Ger ». Robert
denial of actual malice. The movant has the burden of Welch, Inc., 418 U.S, 323, 342, 94 8.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41
showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, but the plaintiff L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). These New York Times requirements we
is not thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn have since extended to libel suits brought by public figures as
evidence that would support a jury verdict. Pp. 2514-2515. well. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S, 130,
87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).
241 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 746 F.2d 1563, vacated and
remanded. This case presents the question whether the clear-and-
convincing-evidence requirement must be considered by a
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which court ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case to which
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting New York Times applies. The United States Court of Appeals
opinion, post, p. —. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting for the District of Columbia Circuit held that that requirement
opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. —. need not be considered at the summary judgment stage.
241 US.App.D.C. 246, 746 F.2d 1563 (1984). We granted
certiorari, 471 U.S. 1134, 105 S.Ct. 2672, 86 L.Ad.2d 691
Attorneys and Law Firms (1985}, because that holding was in conflict with decisions
of several other Courts of Appeals, which had held that the
David J. Branson argued the cause for petitioners. With him
New York Times requirement of clear and convincing evidence
on the briefs was David O. Bickart.
must be considered on a motion for summary judgment. We
Mark Lane argued the cause for respondents. With him on the now reverse.
brief were Linda Huber and Fleming Lee.*
* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by Robert I
D. Sack, Robert S. Warren, W. Terry Maguire, Richard M.
Respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., is a not-for-profit
Schmidt, Jr, R. Bruce Rich, Lawrence Gunnels, Harvey L.
corporation and self-described “citizens' lobby.” Respondent
Lipton, Peter C. Gould, and Jane E. Kirtley; for the Reader's
Willis Carto is its founder and treasurer. In October 1981,
Digest Association, Inc., by Walter R. Allan and Karen J.
*245 The Investigator magazine published two articles:
Wagner.
“The Private World of Willis Carto” and “Yockey: Profile
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the of an American Hitler.” These articles were introduced
American Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo; and for by a third, shorter article entitled “America’s Neo-Nazi
the Synanon Church et al. by Jonathan W. Lubell, Philip C. Underground: Did Mein Kampf Spawn Yockey's Imperium,
Bourdette, David R. Benjamin, and Andrew J. Weill. a Book Revived by Carto's Liberty Lobby?” These articles
portrayed respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and
Opinion Fascist.
*244 **2508 Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Respondents filed this diversity libel action in the United
Court. States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that
some 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the 3 articles were
false and derogatory. Named as defendants in the action were
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby In 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
ery.
petitioner Jack Anderson, the publisher of The Investigator, nevertheless held that for the purposes of summary judgment
petitioner Bill Adkins, president and chief executive officer the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and
of the Investigator Publishing Co., and petitioner Investigator convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of
Publishing Co. itself. the evidence, was irrelevant: To defeat summary judgment
respondents did not have to show that a jury could find
Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary actual malice with “convincing clarity.” The court based
judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In their motion, petitioners this conclusion on a perception that to impose the greater
asserted that because respondents are public figures they were evidentiary burden at summary judgment “would change
required to prove their case under the standards set forth the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for
in New York Times. Petitioners also asserted that summary a minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an
judgment was proper because actual malice was absent as a evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem)
matter of law. In support of this latter assertion, petitioners of the weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts
submitted the affidavit of Charles Bermant, an employee of as well.” 241 U.S.App.D.C., at 253, 746 F.2d, at 1570. The
petitioners and the author of the two longer articles.? In court then held, with respect to nine of the statements, that
this affidavit, Bermant stated that he had spent a substantial summary judgment had been improperly granted because “
amount of time researching **2509 and writing the articles jury could reasonably conclude that the ... allegations were
and that his facts were obtained from a wide variety of defamatory, false, and made with actual malice.” /d., at 260,
sources. He also stated that he had at all times believed 746 F.2d at 1577.
and still believed that the facts contained in the articles
were truthful and accurate. Attached to this affidavit was an
appendix in which Bermant detailed the sources for each of I
the statements alleged by respondents to be libelous.
*246 Respondents opposed the motion for summary A
judgment, asserting that there were numerous inaccuracies in
Our inquiry is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
the articles and claiming that an issue of actual malice was
holding that the heightened evidentiary requirements that
presented by virtue of the fact that in preparing the articles
apply to proof of actual malice in this New York Times
Bermant had relied on several sources that respondents
case need not be considered for the purposes of a motion
asserted were patently unreliable. Generally, respondents
for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of
charged that petitioners had failed adequately to verify their
Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment “shall be
information before publishing. Respondents also presented
rendered forthwith if **2510 the pleadings, depositions,
evidence that William McGaw, an editor of The Investigator,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
had told petitioner Adkins before publication that the articles
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
were “terrible” and “ridiculous.”
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” By its very
In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District
terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some
Court first held that respondents were limited-purpose public
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
figures and that New York Times therefore applied. * The an otherwise properly supported *248 motion for summary
District Court then held that Bermant's thorough investigation judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue
and research and his reliance on numerous sources precluded of material fact.
a finding of actual malice. Thus, the District Court granted the
motion and entered judgment in favor of petitioners. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts
are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to 21 and outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
reversed as to 9 of the allegedly defamatory statements. preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes
Although it noted that respondents did not challenge the that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. See
District Court's ruling that they were limited-purpose public generally 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
*247 figures and that they were thus required to prove Practice and Procedure §$ 2725, pp. 93-95 (1983). This
their case under New York Times, the Court of Appeals materiality inquiry is independent of and separate from the
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby In 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
ery.
question of the incorporation of the evidentiary standard of the existence of certain facts from which “it would be open
into the summary judgment determination. That is, while to a jury ... to infer from the circumstances” that there had
the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, been a meeting of the minds. /d., at 158-159, 90 S.Ct, at
it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are 1608, 1609.
critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs. Any proof
or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law Our prior decisions may not have uniformly recited the same
are not germane to this inquiry, since materiality is only a language in describing genuine factual issues under **2511
criterion for categorizing factual disputes in their relation Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at the
to the legal elements of the claim and not a criterion for summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself
evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes. to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. As
More important for present purposes, summary judgment Adickes, supra, and Cities Service, supra, indicate, there is
will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. In First National party. Cities Service, supra, 391 U.S., at 288-289, 88 S.Ct,
Bank of Arizona vy. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. at 1592. If the evidence is merely colorable, Dombrowski v.
1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), we affirmed a grant of summary Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 8.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967)
judgment for an antitrust defendant where the issue was (per curiam ), or is not significantly probative, *250 Cities
whether there was a genuine factual dispute as to the existence Service, supra, at 290, 88 §.Ct., at 1592, summary judgment
of a conspiracy. We noted Rule 56(¢)'s provision that a party may be granted.
opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment
we may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his That this is the proper focus of the inquiry is strongly
pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there suggested by the Rule itself. Rule 56(¢} provides that, when a
is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” We observed further that properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, *
the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that
“ijt is true that the issue of material fact required by Rule there is a genuine issue for trial.” 5 And, as we noted above,
56(c) to be present to entitle a party to proceed to *249 Rule 56(c) provides that the trial judge shall then grant
trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any
the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment
is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual as a matter of law. There is no requirement that the trial
dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the judge make findings of fact. ® The inquiry performed is the
parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 391 U. at threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for
288-289, 88 S.Ct, at 1592. a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of f
Preview
Filing # 168620600 E-Filed 03/13/2023 04:33:58 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA NIKITA S. PATTERSON, Plaintiff, CASE NO: 2021 CA 1380 VS. WALMART STORES EAST, LP d/b/a WALMART SUPERCENTER #919, Defendants. / NOTICE OF FILING COME(S) NOW the Plaintiff, NIKITA S. PATTERSON, by and through the undersigned attorneys, and gives notice to of filing the following documents, to be filed in this action: 1 Case Law in support of Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 10, 2023. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Thereby certify that a copy of the forgoing has been provided to Andrew Talbert and Tricia Payne of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., by Florida Courts E-Filing Portal and via email to atalbert.pleadings@qpwblaw.com; tstafford.pleadings@qpwblaw.com; and dshally@qpwblaw.com; Jennifer.biskner@qpwblaw.com on this 13th day of March, 2023. /s/ Evin Childs EVIN CHILDS FL Bar No.: 64795 MORGAN & MORGAN 220 West Garden Street, 9" Floor Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: 850-876-7806 Facsimile: 850-876-7830 echilds@forthepeople.com dcohoon@forthepeople.com Attorney for the Plaintiff Nikita Patterson American Hospitality Management Co. of Minnesota v. Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005) 30 Fla. leekly D1 jury as to a rebuttable presumption *548 of negligence. We 904 So.2d 547 agree and reverse. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. The repairman accompanied other air conditioning service AMERICAN HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT personnel to a Holiday Inn. The repairman borrowed a ladder COMPANY OF MINNESOTA, Appellant, from the hotel operator to do the repairs. While using the Vv ladder he fell from it and sustained severe injuries. That same day, the hotel operator destroyed the ladder. Edward P. HETTIGER, III, Appellee. No. 4D03-2001 The repairman sued the hotel operator in negligence and | for spoliation of evidence. Before trial he filed a motion June 1, 2005. for summary judgment on his spoliation of evidence claim | or, alternatively, for an appropriate trial remedy. He argued Rehearing Denied July 15, 2005. that if the ladder were available his expert could testify as to the defect in the ladder, that without the ladder he was Synopsis now at a disadvantage in that he could not prove his claim Background: Repairman who was injured on hotel's of negligence. He also pointed out that, with the ladder premises while using one of hotel's ladders brought action destroyed, the hotel could even argue that the ladder had not against hotel operator for negligence and for spoliation been shown to have been defective. of evidence. The Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Art Wroble, J., ruled in favor of In response, defendant argued that the hotel had no notice that repairman, and hotel operator appealed. a claim was imminent, such as a letter from plaintiff advising of a claim and identifying the evidence to be preserved. Nor was there any evidence that the loss of the ladder affected plaintiff's ability to prove his claim; hotel employees had The District Court of Appeal, Farmer, C.J., held that, because testified in deposition that they knew the ladder was old and the jury instruction actually given at trial erroneously treated that a cross support was broken. Following the arguments the matter as a presumption and unfairly shifted the burden of the court announced it would deny the motion for summary proof as to negligence in the first instance to hotel operator, judgment on the spoliation claim, but would instruct the jury case would be remanded. as to a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Reversed. At trial, the Judge instructed the jury as follows: “The Court has determined and now instructs you, as a Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal. matter of law, that American Hospitality is responsible for Attorneys and Law Firms any negligence of the Holiday Inn Express agents and/or employees. *547 Bard D. Rockenbach, West Palm Beach, and F. Neal Colvin of the Law Offices of Peter J. Delahunty, Palm Beach The defendant, American Hospitality disposed of the Gardens, for appellant. ladder involved in plaintiff, Edward Hettiger's claim on the date that he was injured. The disposal makes it difficult Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Fountain & for the plaintiff to prove that American Hospitality was Williams, L.L.P., West Palm Beach, for appellee. negligent with regard to the ladder in its condition or that such a condition caused plaintiff's injury. Opinion In situations such as this, the Court has the discretion FARMER, C.J. to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff, Edward A hotel operator appeals a mid-trial ruling in favor of a Hettiger, to defendant, American Hospitality. The Court repairman injured on its premises while using one of its has done so. ladders. It argues that the trial court erred by instructing the American Hospitality ManagementCi f Minnesota Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005) se ekly Here, the hotel operator contends that it had no specific As a result of American Hospitality destroying the ladder legal or contractual duty to preserve the ladder after the fall. which is the subject of this lawsuit, the Court has entered It claims that it had no notice that a claim was imminent. a presumption of negligence against Holiday Inn and has Moreover, it argues, even if it had a duty to preserve the ladder determined as a matter of law the following: the repairman failed to establish that the destruction impaired his ability to build a prima facie case of negligence. The trial 1, the ladder is presumed to be defective. court found that the Valcin instruction was warranted because 2, the defective ladder is presumed to have caused Edward the hotel operator had disposed of the ladder on the day of Hettiger to fall. the fall and injury, and that loss impaired the repairman's ability to have the ladder tested to show that it was seriously This is a rebuttable presumption of negligence and the deteriorated and dangerous to use. burden is on the defendant to overcome this presumption by the greater weight of the evidence. In the context of a claim for spoliation of evidence other than medical records, we have held that a defendant could If the defendant does not meet this burden by the greater be charged with a duty to preserve evidence where it could weight of the evidence, then you must find the defendant reasonably have foreseen the claim. See Hagopian y. Publix negligent. This ruling does not eliminate defendant's right Supermarkets, Inc., 788 $0.24 1088, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA to prove negligence on the part of other parties involved in 2001), review denied, 817 So.2d 849 (Fla.2002) (recognizing this case, whether named or not, as well as presenting proof retail establishment's duty to preserve evidence even without to rebut the presumption of negligence I have instructed a contractual, statutory or administrative duty). Although you on.” this is not a products liability claim directly against a manufacturer, plaintiff's claim was founded on an allegation Defendant argues that this instruction went too far, that it that the hotel operator knew that the ladder was dangerous to assumed the truth of disputed facts and interfered with the use. Under this circumstance a finder of fact could reasonably jury's function of resolving conflicts in the evidence. Plaintiff conclude that its unavailability was something other than argues that this issue was not preserved. We disagree with fortuitous. plaintiff as to the preservation issue, finding (without further elaboration) the question *549 adequately preserved at all We agree with plaintiff that the ladder was conceivably critical steps. critical to its claim against the hotel operator. Our concern is with the nature of the instruction given to the jury. The Plaintiff contends that this issue is, or should be, governed effect of the instruction was to have the jury begin with a by Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 $0.24 presumption that defendant was negligent in its provision of 596 (Fla.1987). In that case, the court adopted a rebuttable the ladder and to shift the burden of proof to the defendant presumption of negligence when a health care provider is to disprove any negligence. We think the court erred in this unable to produce essential medical records in a medical malpractice action. One court has held that the destruction regard. of critical evidence in a products liability action may give The Valcin remedy should not have been employed. Valcin rise to a Valcin instruction, where the party had destroyed the evidence during pretrial testing of the product in spite of an involved a patient's medical malpractice claim against a hospital for negligent performance of tubal ligation surgery. agreement with the opposing party not to do so and to return it It turned out that the surgeon's report of the operation was in the same condition in which it had been received before the lost, and that omission hindered plaintiff in proving the testing. Rochovell Int‘. Corp. v. Menzies, 561 So.2d 677 (Fla. claim of negligent surgery. The lost notes of the surgical 3d DCA 1990). We have refused to apply Valcin in medical procedure were not ordinary business records or, as here, malpractice litigation where the missing medical records were equipment. They were a patient's medical records. As the of marginal importance and could not have hindered plaintiff Third District noted on direct appeal in Valcin, Florida law in proving the claim. See Anesthesiology Critical Care & Pain Memt. Consultants, PA. v. Kretzer, 802 So0.2d 346, 349 (Fla. requires the health care provider to furnish a patient's health care records upon request. alein v. Public Health Trust of 4th DCA 2001). Dade County, 473 So.2d 1297, 1306. n. 7 (Fla, 3d DCA 1984); see also *550 § 395,202, Fla. Stat. (1981). Moreover, American Hospitality ManagementCi f Minnesota Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005) se ekly Florida law requires a provider to maintain, among other presumption and an inference, noting that a presumption is things, “medical and surgical treatment notes and reports.” stronger and compels the jury to find the presumed fact if As Judge Pearson put it, “it is clear to us that the hospital's the prescribed circumstances are present. Jd. at 582. Palmas failure to have maintained and produced a record of Valcin's emphasized that an inference differs qualitatively from the surgical procedure is a breach of a duty owing to her which Valcin presumption, which functions to shift the burden cannot go unnoticed and, most assuredly, which cannot inure entirely as to controverted fact. A jury may accept or reject an to the hospital's benefit.” fd. at 1306; see also Fla. Admin. inference as it sees fit. Because the lost test results were not Code Ch. 10D-28.59(3). In short the remedy of a rebuttable crucial to plaintiff's case, the court ruled that any instruction presumption was fashioned in part because of the unique even as to an inference was error in Palmas. Id. at 582-83. duties of health care practitioners with regard to patient's medical records. That circumstance is not present in the case Unlike Jordan and Palmas, the lost ladder in this case we face today. was conceivably crucial. Plaintiff argues that it was the very instrument of his fall, and its condition was critical to the We think this case falls more logically under our own decision question whether the hotel operator was negligent in allowing in Jordan ex rel. Shealey v. Masters, 821 $0.24 3 2, 346 (Fla. its use. We do not think it is per se error to give a jury 4th DCA 2002), and that of the Third District in Palma: 3y instruction as to an adverse inference. In circumstances where Bambu, S.A. v. EJ. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 881 $0.2d the lost evidence was under the sole control of the party 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Jordan involved the failure of a against whom the evidence might have been used to effect, party to produce a videotape of an incident, evidence of which and where the lost evidence is in fact critical to prove the other had already been presented by audiotape at trial. The court party's claim, an adverse *551 inference instruction may be gave an adverse inference instruction whereby the jury could necessary to achieve justice in the jury's determination of the infer the critical fact against the party failing to produce the case. This would be true where the party failing to preserve videotape that had been within its control. Palmas involved the evidence argues that the thing lost was not as represented a products liability claim in which DuPont conducted its by the injured party, or that the injured party should not prevail own tests regarding the product during the litigation and then because of the failure to present the evidence foreclosed by destroyed the evidence of the test and its results. Finding this the loss of the item. destruction in violation of a duty to preserve the evidence, the court gave the jury an adverse inference instruction that Here at any trial on remand, it may be proper to instruct the the jury could infer that the test results were unfavorable to jury that they are free to draw an inference of negligence if the DuPont. hotel operator's destruction of the ladder affected plaintiff's case unfairly. We leave that decision initially in the hands On appeal in Jordan, Judge Warner wrote that “[w]e have of the trial court. If the court decides that justice requires found no case approving an instruction for an adverse an adverse inference instruction, and makes its reasoning inference to be drawn from the failure to produce evidence.” apparent on the record, we suggest (but do not require) that 821 So.2d at 346. Noting that an inference is a determination the court consider something like this edited example from of one fact from the existence of another fact, we quoted Palmas: Ehrhardt for the proposition that it is for the trier of fact to make the determination whether the inferred fact will be determined. /d.; see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, FLORIDA You have heard testimony about potential evidence which EVIDENCE § 301.1 (2001 ed.). We held that “[flor the court the party having custody failed to produce. Plaintiffs have to tell a jury that an adverse inference may be drawn from the argued that this evidence was in defendant's control and failure to produce evidence invades the province of the jury.” would have proven facts material to the issue of negligence. Jordan, 821 So.2d at 346, If you find that this evidence was then within defendant's In Palmas the Third District emphasized that jury instructions control, that defendant could have preserved this evidence must not assume the truth of controverted facts and that so that it was available for the parties in preparing for ordinarily a court interferes with the jury's function when it trial in this case, and that this evidence would have been gives an instruction about specific facts that are controverted. material in deciding the facts in dispute in this case, then 881 So.2d at 580. Palmas also drew a distinction between a you are permitted, but are not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to defendant. American Hospitality Management Co. of Minnesota v. Hettiger, 904 So.2d 547 (2005) 30 Fla. eeklyD4 Any inference you decide to make should be based on all Reversed. of the facts and circumstances in this case. Palmas, 881 So.2d at 581 (adapted from Gilbert v. Cosco Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 405 n. 5 (10th Cir, 1993). STONE and MAY, JJ., concur. Because the jury instruction actually given at trial erroneously treated the matter as a presumption and unfairly All Citations shifted the burden of proof as to negligence in the first instance to the defendant we remand the case to the trial court 904 So.2d 547, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D1381 for a new trial. Footnotes We note that this case was decided by the jury on the negligence claim only. In the meantime, we have determined that in a first party case plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain both negligence and spoliation claims against the same defendant. Safeguard Mgt., Inc. v. Pinedo, 865 So.2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), and Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 835 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Our remand is therefore limited to the negligence claim only. The citation to Valcin in Safeguard should not be misunderstood as authorizing the presumption of negligence employed in Valcin. Indeed Judge Stevenson's opinion in Safeguard speaks several times of an adverse inference, not of a presumption. ve ~ End of Document © 2023 Thomson Reuiers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby In 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ery. described as a “citizens' lobby” and its founder, filed a libel 106 S.Ct. 2505 action in Federal District Court against petitioners, alleging Supreme Court of the United States that certain statements in a magazine published by petitioners were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners jack ANDERSON, et al., Petitioners moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of v. Civil Procedure 56, asserting that because respondents were LIBERTY LOBBY, INC. and Willis A. Carto. public figures they were required to prove their case under the New York Times standards and that summary judgment was No. 84-1602 proper because actual malice was absent as a matter of law in | view of an affidavit by the author of the articles in question Argued Dec. 3, 1985. that they had been thoroughly researched and that the facts | were obtained from numerous sources. Opposing the motion, Decided June 25, 1986. respondents claimed that an issue of actual malice was presented because the author had relied on patently unreliable Synopsis sources in preparing the articles. After holding that New Libel action was brought against magazine, its publisher, and York Times applied because respondents were limited-purpose its chief executive officer. The United States District Court for public figures, the District Court entered summary judgment the District of Columbia, 562 F.Supp. 201, granted summary for petitioners on the ground that the author's investigation judgment in favor of defendants and plaintiffs appealed. The and research and his reliance on numerous sources precluded Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 746 a finding of actual malice. Reversing as to certain of the F.2d, 1563, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme allegedly defamatory statements, the Court of Appeals held Court, Justice White, held that: (1) ruling on motion for that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and summary judgment or directed verdict necessarily implicates convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary that substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would judgment stage, and that with respect to those statements apply at a trial on the merits, and (2) when determining if summary judgment had been improperly granted because a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists in a libel suit jury could reasonably have concluded that the allegations brought by a public figure, trial judge must bear in mind were defamatory, false, and made with actual malice. the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under the New York Times doctrine. Held: The Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard in reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment. Vacated and remanded. Pp. 2509-2515. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion. (a) Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” that is, if the evidence is such that Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving Justice Burger joined. party. At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and *243 Procedural Posture(s): Motion for Summary Judgment. determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no such issue unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for **2506 *242 Syllabus” a jury to return a verdict for that party. In essence, the inquiry In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US, 284, 84 is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, it was held that, in a libel suit require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that brought by a public official (extended by later cases to one party must prevail as a matter of law. Pp. 2509-2512. public figures), the First Amendment requires **2507 the plaintiff to show that in publishing the alleged defamatory (b) A trial court ruling on a motion for summary judgment ina statement the defendant acted with actual malice. It was case such as this must be guided by the New York Times “clear further held that such actual malice must be shown with and convincing” evidentiary standard in determining whether “convincing clarity.” Respondents, a nonprofit corporation a genuine issue of actual malice exists, that is, whether the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ATT US, 242 (1986) 106. 05, 9 Us| 4755, Fed.R.Ser evidence is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254, 279-280, malice had been shown with convincing clarity. Pp. 2512- 84 S.Ct. 710, 72. 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), we held 2514. that, in a libel suit brought by a public official, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that in publishing (c) A plaintiff may not defeat a defendant's properly supported the defamatory statement the defendant acted with actual motion for summary judgment in a libel case such as this malice—“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless one without offering any concrete evidence from which a disregard of whether it was false or not.” We held further that reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor and by such actual malice must be shown with “convincing clarity.” merely asserting that the jury might disbelieve the defendant's Ad., at 285-286, 84 S.Ct, at 728-729, See also Ger ». Robert denial of actual malice. The movant has the burden of Welch, Inc., 418 U.S, 323, 342, 94 8.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, but the plaintiff L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). These New York Times requirements we is not thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn have since extended to libel suits brought by public figures as evidence that would support a jury verdict. Pp. 2514-2515. well. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S, 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). 241 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 746 F.2d 1563, vacated and remanded. This case presents the question whether the clear-and- convincing-evidence requirement must be considered by a WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which court ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case to which O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting New York Times applies. The United States Court of Appeals opinion, post, p. —. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting for the District of Columbia Circuit held that that requirement opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. —. need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. 241 US.App.D.C. 246, 746 F.2d 1563 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1134, 105 S.Ct. 2672, 86 L.Ad.2d 691 Attorneys and Law Firms (1985}, because that holding was in conflict with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals, which had held that the David J. Branson argued the cause for petitioners. With him New York Times requirement of clear and convincing evidence on the briefs was David O. Bickart. must be considered on a motion for summary judgment. We Mark Lane argued the cause for respondents. With him on the now reverse. brief were Linda Huber and Fleming Lee.* * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by Robert I D. Sack, Robert S. Warren, W. Terry Maguire, Richard M. Respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., is a not-for-profit Schmidt, Jr, R. Bruce Rich, Lawrence Gunnels, Harvey L. corporation and self-described “citizens' lobby.” Respondent Lipton, Peter C. Gould, and Jane E. Kirtley; for the Reader's Willis Carto is its founder and treasurer. In October 1981, Digest Association, Inc., by Walter R. Allan and Karen J. *245 The Investigator magazine published two articles: Wagner. “The Private World of Willis Carto” and “Yockey: Profile Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the of an American Hitler.” These articles were introduced American Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo; and for by a third, shorter article entitled “America’s Neo-Nazi the Synanon Church et al. by Jonathan W. Lubell, Philip C. Underground: Did Mein Kampf Spawn Yockey's Imperium, Bourdette, David R. Benjamin, and Andrew J. Weill. a Book Revived by Carto's Liberty Lobby?” These articles portrayed respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Opinion Fascist. *244 **2508 Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Respondents filed this diversity libel action in the United Court. States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that some 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the 3 articles were false and derogatory. Named as defendants in the action were Anderson v. Liberty Lobby In 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ery. petitioner Jack Anderson, the publisher of The Investigator, nevertheless held that for the purposes of summary judgment petitioner Bill Adkins, president and chief executive officer the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and of the Investigator Publishing Co., and petitioner Investigator convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of Publishing Co. itself. the evidence, was irrelevant: To defeat summary judgment respondents did not have to show that a jury could find Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary actual malice with “convincing clarity.” The court based judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In their motion, petitioners this conclusion on a perception that to impose the greater asserted that because respondents are public figures they were evidentiary burden at summary judgment “would change required to prove their case under the standards set forth the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for in New York Times. Petitioners also asserted that summary a minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an judgment was proper because actual malice was absent as a evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem) matter of law. In support of this latter assertion, petitioners of the weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts submitted the affidavit of Charles Bermant, an employee of as well.” 241 U.S.App.D.C., at 253, 746 F.2d, at 1570. The petitioners and the author of the two longer articles.? In court then held, with respect to nine of the statements, that this affidavit, Bermant stated that he had spent a substantial summary judgment had been improperly granted because “ amount of time researching **2509 and writing the articles jury could reasonably conclude that the ... allegations were and that his facts were obtained from a wide variety of defamatory, false, and made with actual malice.” /d., at 260, sources. He also stated that he had at all times believed 746 F.2d at 1577. and still believed that the facts contained in the articles were truthful and accurate. Attached to this affidavit was an appendix in which Bermant detailed the sources for each of I the statements alleged by respondents to be libelous. *246 Respondents opposed the motion for summary A judgment, asserting that there were numerous inaccuracies in Our inquiry is whether the Court of Appeals erred in the articles and claiming that an issue of actual malice was holding that the heightened evidentiary requirements that presented by virtue of the fact that in preparing the articles apply to proof of actual malice in this New York Times Bermant had relied on several sources that respondents case need not be considered for the purposes of a motion asserted were patently unreliable. Generally, respondents for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of charged that petitioners had failed adequately to verify their Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment “shall be information before publishing. Respondents also presented rendered forthwith if **2510 the pleadings, depositions, evidence that William McGaw, an editor of The Investigator, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together had told petitioner Adkins before publication that the articles with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine were “terrible” and “ridiculous.” issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” By its very In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some Court first held that respondents were limited-purpose public alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat figures and that New York Times therefore applied. * The an otherwise properly supported *248 motion for summary District Court then held that Bermant's thorough investigation judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue and research and his reliance on numerous sources precluded of material fact. a finding of actual malice. Thus, the District Court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of petitioners. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to 21 and outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly reversed as to 9 of the allegedly defamatory statements. preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes Although it noted that respondents did not challenge the that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. See District Court's ruling that they were limited-purpose public generally 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal *247 figures and that they were thus required to prove Practice and Procedure §$ 2725, pp. 93-95 (1983). This their case under New York Times, the Court of Appeals materiality inquiry is independent of and separate from the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby In 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ery. question of the incorporation of the evidentiary standard of the existence of certain facts from which “it would be open into the summary judgment determination. That is, while to a jury ... to infer from the circumstances” that there had the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, been a meeting of the minds. /d., at 158-159, 90 S.Ct, at it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are 1608, 1609. critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs. Any proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law Our prior decisions may not have uniformly recited the same are not germane to this inquiry, since materiality is only a language in describing genuine factual issues under **2511 criterion for categorizing factual disputes in their relation Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at the to the legal elements of the claim and not a criterion for summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes. to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. As More important for present purposes, summary judgment Adickes, supra, and Cities Service, supra, indicate, there is will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that return a verdict for the nonmoving party. In First National party. Cities Service, supra, 391 U.S., at 288-289, 88 S.Ct, Bank of Arizona vy. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. at 1592. If the evidence is merely colorable, Dombrowski v. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), we affirmed a grant of summary Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 8.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) judgment for an antitrust defendant where the issue was (per curiam ), or is not significantly probative, *250 Cities whether there was a genuine factual dispute as to the existence Service, supra, at 290, 88 §.Ct., at 1592, summary judgment of a conspiracy. We noted Rule 56(¢)'s provision that a party may be granted. opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment we may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his That this is the proper focus of the inquiry is strongly pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there suggested by the Rule itself. Rule 56(¢} provides that, when a is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” We observed further that properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, * the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that “ijt is true that the issue of material fact required by Rule there is a genuine issue for trial.” 5 And, as we noted above, 56(c) to be present to entitle a party to proceed to *249 Rule 56(c) provides that the trial judge shall then grant trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual as a matter of law. There is no requirement that the trial dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the judge make findings of fact. ® The inquiry performed is the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 391 U. at threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for 288-289, 88 S.Ct, at 1592. a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of f